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FACING REAL-TIME IDENTIFICATION IN
MOBILE APPS & WEARABLE COMPUTERS
Yana Welinder†
Abstract
The use of face recognition technology in mobile apps and
wearable computers challenges individuals’ ability to remain
anonymous in public places. These apps can also link individuals’
offline activities to their online profiles, generating a digital paper
trail of their every move. The ability to go off the radar allows for
quiet reflection and daring experimentation—processes that are
essential to a productive and democratic society. Given what we
stand to lose, we ought to be cautious with groundbreaking
technological progress. It does not mean that we have to move any
slower, but we should think about potential consequences of the steps
that we take.
This article maps out the recently launched face recognition
apps and some emerging regulatory responses to offer initial policy
considerations. With respect to current apps, app developers should
consider how the relevant individuals could be put on notice given
that the apps will not only be using information about their users, but
also about the persons being identified. They should also consider
how the apps could minimize their data collection and retention and
keep the data secure. Today’s face recognition apps mostly use
photos from social networks. They therefore call for regulatory
responses that consider the context in which users originally shared
the photos. Most importantly, the article highlights that the Federal
Trade Commission’s first policy response to consumer applications
that use face recognition did not follow the well-established principle
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of technology neutrality. The article argues that any regulation with
respect to identification in real time should be technology neutral and
narrowly address harmful uses of computer vision without hampering
the development of useful applications.
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INTRODUCTION
In a thrilling scene in the computer-animated film The
Incredibles, Mr. Incredible stumbles upon a tablet-like device. The
device scans his face with a camera, identifies him as Mr. Incredible,
and proceeds with telling him a classified message before it selfdestructs. Is this technology something you would only see in a
fiction cartoon about superheroes? As it happens, it is neither
imaginary nor sci-fi. In fact, a mobile application with similar
functionality can today be downloaded instantly to your smartphone
for $1.99—save the self-destruction.1
But while we may observe some mobile applications of face
recognition technology crop up in the iTunes store and elsewhere, this
technology is still in its infancy. Computer scientists have been
working on face recognition technology for decades, but the
technology has only recently been implemented in consumer
applications. These applications leverage the vast amount of labeled
photos aggregated in social networks and the users’ oblivious
keenness to teach algorithms how to recognize their friends. The
ubiquity of mobile phones with built-in cameras presents a new
opportunity for this technology. For now, face recognition with
mobile phones requires fast Internet connection to communicate with
servers that can store all the data about faces and process the
information.2 But this too is now being enabled through rapid
progress in mobile Internet speeds and the deployment of 4G mobile
broadband.3
The use of face recognition technology in mobile apps
challenges individuals’ ability to remain anonymous in public places.
These apps—in their current iteration—encourage users to upload
photos with identified faces to social networks, along with embedded
metadata revealing where and when they were captured.
Consequently, when uploaded, the labeled images generate a digital

1. See
FaceLook
Face
Recognition
Lite,
ITUNES,
https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/facelook-face-recognition/id512967999?mt=8 (last visited Dec.
8, 2012).
2. Moore’s law predicts that the number of components on integrated circuits will
double every two years and so eventually phones may have sufficient memory capacity and
processing power to perform face recognition of a large number of individuals locally on the
phones. See Excerpts from A Conversation with Gordon Moore: Moore’s Law, INTEL 1 (2005).
3. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND
PLAN 22 (2010), available at http://www.broadband.gov/plan/ (describing the upgrade to 4G
mobile networks).
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paper trail of the individuals’ location in the photo. The apps have
this effect without seeking the consent of the identified individuals,
who will not have seen the privacy notice displayed when an app was
downloaded, and may not even know that they were photographed or
identified. In essence, this practice subjects individuals to a possible
surveillance by their peers, employers, and companies that have an
interest in their everyday choices, and perhaps even the government.
The ability to go off the radar allows for quiet reflection and daring
experimentation—processes that are essential to a productive and
democratic society.4 In the words of privacy scholar Julie Cohen,
“citizens who are subject to pervasively distributed surveillance and
modulation
by
powerful
commercial
and
political
interests . . . increasingly will lack the capacity to form and pursue
meaningful agendas for human flourishing.”5 Given what we stand to
lose, we ought to be cautious with groundbreaking technological
progress. It does not mean that we have to move any slower, but we
should think about potential consequences of the steps that we take.6
This article maps out the recently launched real-time
identification applications and some emerging regulatory responses to
offer initial considerations for regulating this type of app. With
respect to current apps, app developers should consider how the
relevant individuals could be put on notice given that the apps will not
only be using information about their users, but also about the persons
being identified. They should also consider how the apps could
minimize their data collection and retention and keep the data secure.
Today’s real-time identification apps mostly use photos from social
networks. They therefore call for regulatory responses that consider
the context in which users originally shared the photos. Most
importantly, I note that the FTC’s first policy response to consumer
applications that use face recognition did not follow the wellestablished principle of technology neutrality. I argue that any
regulation with respect to real-time identification should be
technology neutral and narrowly address harmful uses of computer
vision without hampering the development of useful applications.
As such, Part I of this article broadly outlines how face

4. See Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013)
(manuscript
at
2),
available
at
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/symposium/papers2012/cohen.pdf (last visited Apr. 19,
2013).
5. Id. at 7.
6. See discussion infra Part IV.
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recognition technology works and presents a few early examples of
how it has been implemented in real-time identification apps. Part II
explores the privacy implications of these apps. To provide some
policy context, this Part also compares the real-time identification
apps to mobile apps that use geolocation data, which has been a
recent concern for privacy advocates. Part III reviews two broader
regulatory responses to face recognition technology in the United
States and Europe to identify some principles that may pertain to realtime identification. Finally, Part IV offers five initial principles to
consider when regulating these apps in order to protect both
fundamental privacy interests and innovation.
I.

REAL-TIME FACE RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY USING PHONES
(AND GLASSES)
A. The Process of Automatic Face Recognition in Real Time

Disruptive and highly visible uses of technology sometimes
prompt hurried and overbroad policy responses.
The recent
implementation of face recognition technology in mobile apps and
social networks are but two applications of a field that has been
developing for decades but may not yet have realized its full potential.
As I discuss in Part IV below, it is therefore important to formulate
policy that narrowly targets particular uses of face recognition
without impacting the development of the technology. To appreciate
the limited role of the recent consumer applications of face
recognition technology, it is helpful to briefly review the history of
the development and application of face recognition techniques.
Computer scientists have long been captivated by the possibility
of getting computers to recognize faces. When recognizing a
person’s face, you need not solicit interaction by asking for a name or
taking a fingerprint.7 Though perhaps less precise, face recognition
technology is certainly more convenient than many other types of
biometric recognition that require individuals to consciously submit to
the recognition process.8 But more importantly, face recognition is
the main process by which humans recognize each other.9 And so this
research problem presents one piece of the puzzle to get computers to
simulate—or even excel at—human vision and, more broadly, the

7. Tanzeem Choudhury, History of Face Recognition, MIT MEDIA LAB (Jan. 21, 2000),
http://vismod.media.mit.edu/tech-reports/TR-516/node7.html.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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quest for artificial intelligence.
In 1973, Takeo Kanade published his PhD thesis at Kyoto
University in Japan, outlining one of the earliest face recognition
technologies.10
While Kanade’s work was revolutionary, the
technology did not really take off until 1991, when Matthew Turk and
Alex Pentland presented a method for distinguishing faces from
crowded environments.11 This was the beginning of real-time
identification, but the technology has gone a long way since.12
Today’s face recognition methods generally begin with an
analysis of “training images” of already known individuals to
measure their facial features.13 The measurements, also known as
“biometric data,” are collected into a biometric database.14 Once a
biometric database is compiled, face recognition technology can use it
to recognize the listed individuals in new photos.15 This, of course,
means that the person using the technology and the database does not
need to know anything about the listed individuals to be able to
recognize them. The user only needs to upload a photo to a computer
or web application that uses the technology and has access to the
database.16 The technology then tries to detect a face in the new
photo.17 If it finds a face, the technology transforms its size, position,
illumination, and color-scale so that it can be compared to biometric
data gathered under other conditions.18 In other words, it normalizes
the photo.19 Finally, it measures the facial features in the normalized
photo and compares them against the measurements in the biometric
database to determine if the face corresponds to one of the listed

10. HANDBOOK OF FACE RECOGNITION 1 (Stan Z. Li & Anil K. Jain eds., 2d ed. 2011)
(citing Takeo Kanade, Picture Processing by Computer Complex and Recognition of Human
Faces (1973) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Kyoto University)).
11. Choudhury, supra note 7.
12. Choudhury, supra note 7.
13. See HANDBOOK OF FACE RECOGNITION 2-3 (Stan Z. Li & Anil K. Jain eds., 1st ed.
2005).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Party 29 Opinion on Facial
Recognition in Online and Mobile Service, 2012 00727/12 (WP 192) (EN), 2012 O.J. (L 727) 2
(EN) [hereinafter WP29 Opinion], available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/dataprotection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2012/wp192_en.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 7, 2013).
17. See HANDBOOK OF FACE RECOGNITION, supra note 13, at 2-3.
18. See id.
19. See id.
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individuals.20 As researchers perfected this process, face recognition
technology began cropping up in consumer applications such as
iPhoto, Picasa, Facebook, Google Plus, and Microsoft’s Kinect
gaming device.21
The availability of ubiquitous camera phones with fast Internet
connection means that this process can also be performed directly via
a mobile app. This eliminates the delay of having to upload a photo
to a computer or web application. A camera phone user can simply
snap a picture of an anonymous face and instantly get information
about that individual on the phone screen in real-time. The
photographed individual would likely not even realize that she was
being automatically identified.22 Today, it has become so common to
take photos of food and other mundane things that it is virtually
impossible to figure out when a stranger is trying to take a photo of
your face.23 Secret photographing will further be facilitated by
wearable computers, which will incorporate the functionalities of
smartphones into head mounted displays. 24
B. Early Applications of Real-Time Identification
In 2011, a research team at Carnegie Mellon University showed
that publicly available face recognition technology (which was
subsequently acquired by Google) could be applied to Facebook
photos to identify college students on a campus with a 31.18 percent
success rate in only a few seconds.25 Various mobile apps have
similarly tapped into Facebook’s vast photo database to recognize

20. See id.
21. See, e.g., Alessandro Acquisti et al., Faces of Facebook: Privacy in the Age of
Augmented
Reality,
BLACK
HAT
WEBCAST
1
(Jan.
9,
2012),
http://www.blackhat.com/docs/webcast/acquisti-face-BH-Webinar-2012-out.pdf; Larry Magid,
Google+ Adds Find My Face Feature, FORBES (Dec. 8, 2011, 1:59 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrymagid/2011/12/08/google-adds-find-my-face-feature/.
See
also Douglas Gantenbein, Helping Kinect Recognize Faces, MICROSOFT RESEARCH (Oct. 31,
2011), http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/news/features/kinectfacereco-103111.aspx.
22. See WP29 Opinion, supra note 16, at 1 (“images of an individual may be captured
(with or without the individual being aware)”).
23. College humor has an excellent parody about this new trend to photograph
everything. See Look at this Instagram, COLLEGE HUMOR (Dec. 3, 2012),
http://www.collegehumor.com/video/6853117/look-at-this-instagram-nickelback-parody.
24. See, e.g., Paul Miller, Project Glass and the Epic History of Wearable Computers,
THE VERGE (June 26, 2012, 2:42 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2012/6/26/2986317/googleproject-glass-wearable-computers-disappoint-me. See also infra Part I.C.
25. Alessandro Acquisti et al., Faces of Facebook: Privacy in the Age of Augmented
Reality,
BLACK
HAT
WEBCAST
1
(Jan.
9,
2012),
http://www.blackhat.com/docs/webcast/acquisti-face-BH-Webinar-2012-out.pdf.
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individuals in real-time. In 2012, Face.com was offering an iPhone
app called KLIK, which identified users’ Facebook friends in a photo
while it was being taken.26 KLIK had serious security vulnerabilities
and was discontinued as soon as Facebook acquired Face.com that
same year.27 FaceLook is another app that uses Facebook photos to
recognize faces with an iPhone in real time.28 Android users can do
the same with Viewdle SocialCamera, which was acquired by
Google’s Motorola Mobility in late 2012.29 Given the recent boom in
face recognition technology, it should be no surprise that start-ups
using the technology are hot acquisition targets for today’s tech
giants.30
Most of these apps allow users to upload photos to social
networks after they automatically identify the photographed
individuals. Uploaded photos may include metadata about where the
photo was taken.31 And even if the metadata could be scraped before
it is shown to other social network users, the location of the photo
may still be obvious from landmarks in the background.32 For
26. See David Goldman, Real-time Face Recognition Comes to Your iPhone Camera,
CNN MONEY, Mar. 12, 2012, http://money.cnn.com/2012/03/12/technology/iPhone-facerecognition/index.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2012).
27. See Ashkan Soltani, Facepalm, ASHKANSOLTANI (June 18, 2012),
http://ashkansoltani.org/2012/06/18/facepalm/ (last visited Jul. 21, 2013) (“Face.com essentially
allowed anyone to hijack a KLIK user’s Facebook and Twitter accounts to get access to photos
and social graph (which enables ‘face prints’), even if that information isn’t public.” (emphasis
in the original)); Steven Musil, Facebook Shuts Down Face.com APIs, Klik App, CNET NEWS
(July 8, 2012, 11:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57468247-93/facebook-shutsdown-face.com-apis-klik-app/.
28. FaceLook Face Recognition Lite, ITUNES, https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/facelookface-recognition/id512967999?mt=8.
29. See, e.g., Emily Steel, A Face Launches 1,000 Apps, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 5, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903885604576488273434534638.html?mod=
WSJ_Tech_LEFTTopNews;
Viewdle,
CRUNCHBASE,
http://www.crunchbase.com/company/viewdle.
30. In addition to PittPatt and Viewdle, Google has also acquired Neven Vision, Riya,
and Picasa. Apple has acquired the Swedish face recognition company, Polar Rose. See
Alessandro Acquisti et al., Faces of Facebook: Privacy in the Age of Augmented Reality, BLACK
HAT WEBCAST 1 (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.blackhat.com/docs/webcast/acquisti-face-BHWebinar-2012-out.pdf.
31. See, e.g., Facebook Data Use Policy: Information We Receive and How It is Used,
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/your-info#inforeceived (last visited Feb.
8, 2012) (Facebook may get this information as a geotag uploaded with the photo, containing its
exact latitude and longitude). See also Kate Murphy, Web Photos That Reveal Secrets, Like
Where You Live, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2010, at B6.
32. See Vice.com Publishes Exclusive with John McAfee Reveals Location in iPhone
Metadata
(EXIF),
MOBILE
PRIVACY
(Dec.
3,
2012),
http://www.mobileprivacy.org/2012/12/vice-com-publishes-exclusive-with-john-mcafeereveals-location-in-iphone-metadata-exif/; see also Hanni Fakhoury, A Picture is Worth a
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example, other users can easily recognize that a person is in San
Francisco if the Golden Gate Bridge is visible in the background.33
Real-time identification apps thus create a record of location data both
for the app users, who presumably were there to take the photo, and
the photographed individuals.
It should be noted that most of this process could of course be
carried out without face recognition technology. Users can manually
tag photos and upload them to social networks, and there are apps that
provide this very capability.34 But this would require users to actually
know and be able to recognize the individual in question. And users
are more likely to exercise good judgment and be restrained by social
norms when they upload photos of their friends.35 They are also more
likely to know about their friends’ personal circumstances and have a
sense for when uploading photos of them may be inappropriate.
Finally, they are able to ask their friends for permission to post photos
of them and more agreeable if a friend asks them to take down a
photo.
C. Cyborgs, Wearable Computers, and Augmented Reality
While real-time identification apps in mobile phones can identify
individuals without their knowledge, this concern will be exacerbated
with the next wave of smart devices. The development of wearable
computers promises to augment human vision to make humans into
cyborgs. A cyborg or cybernetic organism—a concept thought up by
Manfred Clynes and Nathan Kline in 1960—refers to a human that

Thousand Words, Including Your Location, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Apr. 20,
2012),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/04/picture-worth-thousand-words-including-yourlocation.
33. Fakhoury, supra note 32.
34. See, e.g., Facebook Camera, ITUNES, https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/facebookcamera/id525898024?mt=8; see also Ingrid Lunden, Security Loophole in Facebook’s Camera
App Allowed Hackers to Hijack Accounts Over WiFi [Confirmed], TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 24,
2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/12/24/security-loophole-in-facebooks-camera-app-allowedhackers-to-hijack-accounts-over-wifi/#comment-box.
35. But see Deirdre K. Mulligan & Jennifer King, Bridging the Gap Between Privacy and
Design, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 989, 1008 (2012) (pointedly observing that “‘Facebook friends,’
are often not friends in the traditional sense. As Danah Boyd explains, ‘[t]he term “friend” in
the context of social network sites is not the same as in everyday vernacular. And people know
this . . . The term is terrible but it means something different on these sites; it’s not to anyone’s
advantage to assume that the rules of friendship apply to Friendship.’ A tongue-in-cheek
illustration of this point is offered by the ‘Whopper Sacrifice’ campaign that Burger King ran as
a Facebook Platform application. The campaign offered Facebook users who purged ten
Facebook friends deemed unworthy of their weight in beef a coupon for a free Whopper.
Burger King dispersed many coupons.”).
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has been modified with technology to enhance her capabilities.36 For
example, blind people can wear glasses that record their surrounding
and represent it to them as noises through headphones.37 Another
example is EyeTap, computer glasses famously worn by Steven
Mann, which could be used to improve his night vision or to remove
annoying advertising from his visual spectrum.38 Similarly, one could
imagine glasses with face recognition technology and a connection to
a biometric database, which could augment an individual. She could,
for example, automatically recall important details upon meeting an
acquaintance, such as the name of his spouse or children, where he
works, or whether he has some particular sensibilities that she may
want to avoid in a conversation. The general perception is that people
who naturally possess the skill of paying attention to and
remembering these details are generally well-liked and tend to fare
better in personal and professional life. It is easy to see how others
would like to mimic that skill with technology. Indeed, Steve Mann
explained the value of his device as providing “an on-demand
photographic memory [that] can help all of us by offloading, to a
wearable computer, the task of memorizing now-mundane details that
might only later become important.”39 Yet, his motive with wearing
his EyeTap and logging his experiences in a video “lifeglog” seemed
to be more a political statement in response increased surveillance by
government and corporate entities.40 In his view, a personal
“lifeglog” can counteract surveillance from the top with
“sousveillance” from the bottom—from the perspective of individuals
who are normally under surveillance by various authorities.41
In addition to keeping track of acquaintances, a wearable
computer with face recognition technology could also allow users to
identify people that they do not yet know. The person standing next

36. Manfred E. Clynes & Nathan S. Kline, Cyborgs and space, ASTRONAUTICS, Sept.
1960 at 26, available at http://cyberneticzoo.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/cyborgsAstronautics-sep1960.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2013).
37. See Augmented Reality for the Totally Blind, SEEING WITH SOUND,
http://www.seeingwithsound.com/.
38. Jane Bailey & Ian Kerr, Seizing Control?: The Experience Capture Experiments of
Ringley & Mann, 9 ETHICS & INFO. TECH., no. 2, 2007 at 129, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1303204 (last visited Feb. 11, 2013); see
also Steve Mann: My “Augmediated” Life, IEEE SPECTRUM (Mar. 1, 2013, 2:17 PM),
http://spectrum.ieee.org/geek-life/profiles/steve-mann-my-augmediated-life.
39. Bailey & Kerr, supra note 38, at 129.
40. Id.
41. Ian Kerr & Steve Mann, Exploring Equiveillance, ON THE IDENTITY TRAIL (Jan. 3,
2006, 11:07 PM), http://www.anonequity.org/weblog/archives/2006/01/exploring_equiv_1.php.
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to you in line at the grocery store or a coffee shop may have the exact
same interests as you and you may have incredibly compatible
personalities. Wouldn’t it be great if a pair of computer glasses could
tell you this so that you could seize the day and make a new friend?
This may now be closer to reality as consumer applications of
wearable computing are being developed.
The most notable
consumer product is Google’s Project Glass.42 The computer display
manufacturer Vizux is developing a competitor with its Smart Glasses
M100.43 While Google Glass and M100 have a futuristic design that
is bound to attract a lot of attention if worn in public, the British
Company TTP is developing a device that looks very much like
ordinary black-framed glasses from the front.44 Less sleek than
Google Glass, M100, and the TTP glasses, is the head-borne device
HC1, developed by Motorola Solutions.45 Microsoft has also recently
filed a patent application for “a head mounted display with
supplemental information when viewing a live event.”46 While these

42. Glass, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/glass/start/; see also Details of Google’s
Project Glass Revealed in FCC Report, BBC NEWS (Feb. 1, 2013),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-21290934.
43. Intelligent
Hands-Free
Display
for
Smartphones,
VUZIX,
http://www.vuzix.com/consumer/products_m100.html#overview (last visited Nov. 7, 2013); see
also Best Smart Glasses 2013, SQUIDOO, http://www.squidoo.com/best-smart-glasses (last
visited Nov. 7, 2013).
44. UK Company’s ‘Augmented Reality’ Glasses Could be Better than Google’s, THE
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Sept. 11, 2012), http://www.smh.com.au/digital-life/digital-lifenews/uk-companys-augmented-reality-glasses-could-be-better-than-googles-2012091125pdn.html; see What Happens When You Walk into a Bar Wearing Google Glasses, ZOWCHOW
(Feb. 1, 2013), http://zowchow.com/2013/02/01/what-happens-when-you-walk-into-a-barwearing-google-glasses/ (describing how people are reacting to early adopters of Google Glass);
see also Get Ready For Even More Google Glasshole Sightings, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 28, 2013),
http://techcrunch.com/2013/01/28/glassholes/.
45. Mark Gregory, Motorola Unveils a Computer That Straps onto Your Head, BBC
NEWS (Nov. 13, 2012, 7:01 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-20316589 (While this
helmet-like device with an external snap-on camera will not easily melt into crowds, it is mainly
intended for maintenance and construction work in locations that are difficult to reach with other
computer equipment); see also HC1 Headset Computer, MOTOROLA SOLUTIONS,
http://www.motorola.com/Business/USEN/Business+Product+and+Services/Mobile+Computers/Wearable+Computers/HC1
(last
visited Nov. 7, 2013).
46. U.S. Patent Application No. 13/112,919, Publication No. 20120293548 (filed May
20,
2011),
available
at
http://appft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nphParser?Sect1=PTO1&Sect2=HITOFF&d=PG01&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsrchnum.h
tml&r=1&f=G&l=50&s1=%2220120293548%22.PGNR.&OS=DN/20120293548&RS=DN/201
20293548; see also Alex Wilhelm, Microsoft’s Augmented-Reality Patent Could Square it Off
Against Google’s ‘Glass’ Project, THE NEXT WEB (Nov. 24, 2012, 1:06 AM),
http://thenextweb.com/insider/2012/11/24/microsofts-agumented-reality-patent-could-square-itoff-against-googles-glass-project/.
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products take photos and can connect to the Internet, none of them are
known to include face recognition technology at this point.47 As this
article went to press, Google Glass face recognition and face
classification applications were already being developed.48 In
response to growing privacy concerns, Google issued a statement that
it would not approve face recognition apps for Glass.49
While face recognition technology in computer glasses can have
many useful applications, it does raise the potential that individuals
can be recognized instantly against their will and in situations when
they prefer to remain anonymous. In the case of Mann’s experiment
with EyeTap, which displayed video recordings of people online and
did not run face recognition technology on them, he relied on people’s
ability to object to the recording.50 Ian Kerr has noted that even if
Mann discussed the experiment with his subject before streaming it
online, it would be difficult for them to comprehend the consequences
of their consent.51 Moreover, the EyeTap transformed Mann’s
appearance into a bionic man such that it would be difficult for a
subject not to realize that she is being captured by a piece of
technology while talking to him.52 By contrast, some of the
technologies being developed today can be far more discrete. If
equipped with face recognition technology, these devices could
record and automatically recognize individuals in public without as
much as a sound or flash.53 The following discussion regarding realtime identification apps in mobile phones applies equally to the
47. See, e.g., Intelligent Hands-Free Display for Smartphones, VUZIX,
http://www.vuzix.com/consumer/products_m100.html#specifications (last visited Nov. 7, 2013).
48. David Talbot, Google Irks Developers with Ruling on Facial-Recognition Apps, MIT
TECHNOLOGY
REVIEW,
http://www.technologyreview.com/news/515756/google-irksdevelopers-with-ruling-on-facial-recognition-apps/ (last visited June 16, 2013); see also
ReKognition APIs for Google Glass, ORBEUS, http://glass.rekognition.com/sdk/index.php (last
visited Nov. 7, 2013).
49. Jon Brodkin, Google Forbids Facial Recognition Apps on Glass in the Name of
Privacy, ARS TECHNICA (June 3, 2013, 7:43 AM), http://arstechnica.com/informationtechnology/2013/06/google-forbids-facial-recognition-apps-on-glass-in-the-name-of-privacy/
(last visited June 16, 2013); see also Glass and Facial Recognition, Project Glass, GOOGLE
PLUS (May 31, 2013), https://plus.google.com/u/0/+projectglass/posts/fAe5vo4ZEcE.
50. Bailey & Kerr, supra note 38, at 129.
51. Id.
52. Andy Greenberg, Cyborg Discrimination? Scientist Says McDonald’s Staff Tried To
Pull Off His Google-Glass-Like Eyepiece, Then Threw Him Out, FORBES (July 17, 2012, 8:00
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/07/17/cyborg-discrimination-scientistsays-mcdonalds-staff-tried-to-pull-off-his-google-glass-like-eyepiece-then-threw-him-out/.
53. See M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism In Privacy (And Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1027, 1037, n.54 (2012) (noting that Congress tried to recreate the shutter sound
of analog cameras in camera phones with the Camera Phone Predator Alert Act of 2009).
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potential use of computer glasses with face recognition technology.
II. CONCEPTUAL SIMILARITIES (AND DIFFERENCES) BETWEEN
REAL-TIME IDENTIFICATION AND GEOLOCATION APPLICATIONS
Real-time identification apps will challenge our fundamental
privacy law framework of notice and consent in unprecedented ways.
To show some of the issues they will raise, I compare them here to
geolocation data in mobile apps. Both are capable of determining a
person’s location in real time. But geolocation apps are also very
different in that the person to whom the location data pertains could
potentially have notice of the collection—albeit not a very effective
notice—when downloading the app to her phone and later seeing the
location symbol on the mobile screen when the app uses location
data.54 By comparison, an individual whose face is recognized at a
distance with a real-time identification app on another’s phone does
not even have that luxury. This makes it very difficult for real-time
identification apps to seek meaningful consent of the affected
individual. Their data collection and processing is invisible by
design. In that sense, face recognition is also different from some
other forms of biometric identification where you need to press your
fingerprint or palm against a scanner, putting you on notice of the
identification process.
A. Location, Location, Location
In 1996, the Federal Communication Commission issued an
order requiring mobile service providers to design their services such
that 911 emergency responders would be able to establish a caller’s
location within a 125-meter radius.55 This was accomplished through
determining the caller’s proximity to nearby cell towers.56 Today, the
distance to cell towers can reveal a person’s location with 100 meters

54. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, MOBILE PRIVACY DISCLOSURES: BUILDING TRUST
THROUGH TRANSPARENCY 17-18 (2013) [hereinafter FTC MOBILE PRIVACY DISCLOSURES],
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2013/02/130201mobileprivacyreport.pdf (discussing how
“Apple and Google utilize icons to signal to consumers when an app is accessing their
geolocation information”).
55. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, REVISION OF THE COMMISSION'S RULES TO ENSURE
COMPATIBILITY WITH ENHANCED 911 EMERGENCY CALLING SYSTEM (1996), available at
http://transition.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Wireless/Orders/1996/fcc96264.txt;
see
also
HELEN
NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL
LIFE 24 (2009) [hereinafter NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT].
56. See Daniel Ionescu, Geolocation 101: How it Works, the Apps, and Your Privacy,
TECHHIVE (Mar. 29, 2010, 7:45 PM), http://www.techhive.com/article/192803/geolo.html.
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accuracy, but the location data is becoming more accurate as
providers build new cell towers.57 Most mobile phones also contain
GPS chips that calculate their coordinates based on information
obtained from satellites.58 This method generally provides more
accurate location data than the distance to cell towers and can now
determine a person’s location with ten meters accuracy.59 Although
often less accurate, the proximity to cell towers is still used to
determine location when the GPS chip has bad satellite reception,
which often is the case indoors.60
Mobile apps use location data to, for example, help users
navigating to a destination, to recommend nearby services, or to allow
users to link up with friends that are nearby.61 Users often also selfreport their location online by manually “checking-in” at restaurants,
airports, museums, and other establishments and posting their location
to social networks.62 They do so to tell their friends about what they
are up to or to unlock a virtual reward for having frequented a
particular location.63
While fun and often useful, geolocation data can also be
collected and shared in undesirable ways.64 Unlike a desktop, or even
57. Nicole Ozer et al., Location-Based Services: Time for a Privacy Check-In 4 (ACLU
of N. Cal., 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1732269.
58. Ionescu, supra note 56.
59. See Geolocation Privacy and Surveillance: Hearing on ECPA, Part 2 Before the
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
113th Cong. (2012) (testimony of Prof. Matt Blaze, Assoc. Prof. of Computer and Info. Sci.,
Univ.
of
Pa.),
available
at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/113th/04252013/Blaze%2004252013.pdf (last visited June
22, 2012) (noting that “assumptions that might have been true several years ago, such as that
GPS satellites always provide higher precision location information than the cellular network
does, are no longer universally true today”).
60. Ionescu, supra note 56; The Collection and Use of Location Information for
Commercial Purposes: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, the Subcomm.
on Communications, Technology and the Internet, and the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and
Consumer Protection, 112th Cong. (2010) (testimony of Lorrie Faith Cranor, Assoc. Prof. of
Computer Sci. & Eng’g & Pub. Policy, Carnegie Mellon Univ.), available at
http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20100224/Cranor.Testimony.2010.02.2
4.pdf.
61. Ionescu, supra note 56. See also FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER
PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE 33 (2012) [hereinafter FTC CONSUMER PRIVACY
REPORT], available at http://ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf.
62. Ozer et al., supra note 57, at 4; see also Janne Lindqvist et al., I’m the Mayor of My
House: Examining Why People Use foursquare - a Social-Driven Location Sharing Application,
29 ASS’N FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY CONF. ON HUM. FACTORS IN COMPUTING 1 (2011),
available at http://www.winlab.rutgers.edu/~janne/chi2011web.pdf.
63. Lindqvist et al., supra note 62.
64. FTC CONSUMER PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 61, at 33.
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a laptop, a mobile phone follows its user, tucked into a back pocket or
a purse.65 The mobile phone is powered at most times, collecting vast
amounts of data about its user everywhere.66 In 2011, two security
researchers reported that iPhones store an unencrypted file of location
data history and automatically send it to Apple—though without
identifying each particular user.67 Apple acknowledged that the
magnitude of the location history was a bug, but continued to
maintain seven days worth of data.68 Upon closer inspection, it turned
out that Android phones similarly collect and store data.69
Unbeknownst to users, location data can also be collected by the
numerous apps that can be downloaded to a smartphone. Certain apps
automatically transmit the phone’s location data to external sites with
regular intervals.70 Apps can also share the information with
advertising networks with data flows so complicated that users would
be perplexed even if they were put on notice.71 And even users who
knowingly self-disclose their location online can sometimes
unintentionally tip-off a burglar or a stalker.72 Users may simply not
anticipate how pieces of their data can be compiled and analyzed
further to provide very detailed predictions of their future locations
and actions.73 This “dataveillance” is merely a side effect of the many
65. See FTC MOBILE PRIVACY DISCLOSURES, supra note 54, at 2.
66. See Parker Higgins, Mobile User Privacy Bill of Rights, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUND. (Mar. 2, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/03/best-practices-respect-mobileuser-bill-rights.
67. See Brian X. Chen, iPhone Tracks Your Every Move, and There’s a Map for That,
WIRED (Apr. 20, 2011, 1:30 PM), http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2011/04/iphone-tracks/;
Brian X. Chen, Why and How Apple Is Collecting Your iPhone Location Data, WIRED (Apr. 21,
2011, 5:44 PM), http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2011/04/apple-iphone-tracking/.
68. Apple
Q&A
on
Location
Data,
APPLE
(Apr.
27,
2011),
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2011/04/27Apple-Q-A-on-Location-Data.html.
69. Matthew Panzarino, It’s Not Just the iPhone, Android Stores Your Location Data
Too, THE NEXT WEB (Apr. 21, 2011, 9:31 PM), http://thenextweb.com/google/2011/04/21/itsnot-just-the-iphone-android-stores-your-location-data-too/.
70. See Blaze, supra note 59.
71. FTC MOBILE PRIVACY DISCLOSURES, supra note 54, at 8 (discussing a “survey [that]
showed that many apps . . . shared information with third parties, including advertising
networks, without disclosing this fact”).
72. See, e.g., PLEASE ROB ME, http://pleaserobme.com/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2013); The
Location Privacy Protection Act of 2011 (S. 1223), AL FRANKEN 1,
http://www.franken.senate.gov/files/documents/121011_LocationPrivacyProtection.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 7, 2013) (reporting that in 2006 “approximately 26,000 persons are victims of GPS
stalking”).
73. Robert Lee Hotz, The Real Smart Phone, WALL. ST. J. (Apr. 22, 2011, 7 :34 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704547604576263261679848814.html; FTC
CONSUMER PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 61, at 33 (citing Comment of Electronic Frontier
Foundation, cmt. #00400, at 3); ANN CAVOUKIAN & JEFF JONAS, PRIVACY BY DESIGN IN THE
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useful functions that mobile apps serve.74 It potentially enables both
greater surveillance by the government and monitoring by our peers.75
As the various risks posed by geolocation data are being
unveiled to smartphone users, they become increasingly worried
about services that rely on such data.76 Empirical studies suggest that
the concern for privacy prevents some users from taking advantage of
location sharing apps.77 Those users that do use them, try to avoid
disclosing their home and work locations, as well as the locations of
their friends’ homes.78 The cautious use of technology observed from
studies could be explained by a desire for basic liberties. As Jeffrey
Reiman observed almost a decade ago, when technology enables
perfect surveillance, individuals stand to lose their freedom, their
sense of individuality, and the desire to be different and
experimental.79 They lose their freedom to engage in private
activities for fear of embarrassment or potential damage to their
careers.80 And if individuals constantly think about how their actions
may be perceived by others, they stop acting spontaneously and
restrain themselves to a few well-rehearsed moves.81 With this, they
also lose their symbolic notion of “self-ownership.”82 But most
importantly, they lose their “inner personal core that is the source of

AGE
OF
BIG
DATA
4
(2012),
available
at
http://privacybydesign.ca/content/uploads/2012/06/pbd-big_data.pdf.
74. See NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT, supra note 55, at 23-24 (citing Roger
Clarke).
75. Id. at 24.
76. Jennifer Urban et al., Mobile Phones & Privacy (UC Berkeley Pub. Law Res., Paper
No. 2103405, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2103405;
Privacy Please! U.S. Smartphone App Users Concerned with Privacy When It Comes to
Location, NIELSEN (Apr. 21, 2011), http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/online_mobile/privacyplease-u-s-smartphone-app-users-concerned-with-privacy-when-it-comes-to-location/.
77. See JAN LAUREN BOYLES ET AL., PRIVACY AND DATA MANAGEMENT ON MOBILE
DEVICES
(2012),
available
at
http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2012/PIP_MobilePrivacyManagement.pdf
(finding that “57% of all app users have either uninstalled an app over concerns about having to
share their personal information, or declined to install an app in the first place for similar
reasons”); see also Lindqvist et al., supra note 62 (noting that research “has found that privacy
is a barrier to adoption of location sharing services”).
78. See Lindqvist et al., supra note 62.
79. Jeffrey Reiman, Driving to the Panopticon: A Philosophical Exploration of the Risks
to Privacy Posed by the Highway Technology of the Future, 1 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 11, 27 (1995).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 38.
82. Id.
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criticism of convention, of creativity, rebellion and renewal.”83 This
is not only a loss for individuals, but affects innovation and societal
progress more generally.84 Mobile users may not be thinking about
the big picture. But the short-term fear of losing freedom to make
individual choices may explain why users are anxious that the
increased use of location data in mobile apps could lead to greater
monitoring of their movements.
Real-time identification apps raise similar concerns.
By
identifying a face with a mobile phone camera, the app generates a
record of that individual’s location.85 The record can be stored in the
phone or be uploaded to a social network, where it may be connected
to the photographed individual’s profile.86 The uploaded photo can
contain embedded metadata such as when and where the photo was
taken.87 This means that real-time identification apps can generate
location data for a particular individual, which may be far more
precise than the geolocation data based on GPS or distance to cell
towers. It may also be more sensitive because the photo shows what
the person is doing and whom she is with, while her facial expression
may reveal her mood.88 The decision of how that location data is
shared is ultimately with the app user rather than the photographed
individual. It could therefore result in unwanted collection and
sharing of location data.
Both location data and real-time identification are difficult to
protect because they often involve the contradictory notion of
“privacy in public.”89 The black and white polarity between private

83.
84.

Id. at 42.
PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 213, 225 (1995).
85. See Soltani, supra note 27; Steven Musil, Facebook Shuts Down Face.com APIs, Klik
App, CNET NEWS (July 8, 2012, 11:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-5746824793/facebook-shuts-down-face.com-apis-klik-app/.
86. See id.
87. See e.g., Hanni Fakhoury, A Picture is Worth a Thousand Words, Including Your
Location,
ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER
FOUND.
(Apr.
20,
2012),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/04/picture-worth-thousand-words-including-your-location
(location data embedded in photos).
88. Bianca Bosker, Affectiva’s Emotion Recognition Tech: When Machines Know What
You’re
Feeling,
The
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Dec.
24,
2012,
3:22
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/24/affectiva-emotion-recognitiontechnology_n_2360136.html.
89. See Helen Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem of
Privacy
in
Public,
17
LAW
&
PHIL.
559
(1998),
available
at
http://www.nyu.edu/projects/nissenbaum/papers/privacy.pdf (last visited June 23, 2013). Both
location data and real-time recognition can of course also be used to track individuals when they
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and public spheres has largely been rejected as scholars have
developed more elaborate conceptualizations of privacy. Yet current
privacy law and theory still recognize that privacy interests are not
absolute and must be balanced against competing interests.90
Asserting a privacy interest in public space is often seen to have
implications for other interests—such as a photographer’s desire to
capture her surroundings or a government’s interest in conducting
surveillance to ensure public safety.91 It is easy to dismiss a privacy
interest in public with an understanding that a person has voluntarily
chosen to give up her privacy by appearing in public.92 The lack of
privacy is seen as the price people pay to avoid a life in isolation.
They are rewarded with social interaction, financial opportunities,
cultured life, and other benefits. But until now, this transaction has
not in practice led to complete loss of privacy. People have been free
to move about in public and rely on their anonymity as against
strangers. The ability to track their movements with location data and
real-time identification changes the terms of the social contract.
B. No Notice or Consent
While real-time identification and geolocation apps are both
capable of collecting sensitive location data, they have one stark
difference: the real-time identification app can collect, use, and share
location data pertaining to a passer-by, who has neither brought the
phone to the location in question, nor downloaded the relevant app.
And while commentators question the effectiveness of notice in
geolocation apps,93 it is clear that there is no such notice at all in realtime identification apps.
Not all apps that collect or use geolocation data provide a
privacy notice to the users.94 Some of these apps have recently come
under scrutiny for failing to provide a notice before collecting private
are in private places.
90. Id. at 571.
91. See id.
92. Id.
93. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE 70 (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf.
94. FTC CONSUMER PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 61, at 33. See also DANIEL J. SOLOVE
& PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY, INFORMATION, & TECHNOLOGY (2012) (noting that in 2011
“22 out of 30 [mobile apps] did not have a privacy policy”); Janice Y. Tsai et al., LocationSharing Technologies: Privacy Risks and Controls, CYLAB USABLE PRIVACY AND SECURITY
LAB.
8
(February
2010),
http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/LBSprivacy/files/TsaiKelleyCranorSadeh_2009.pdf (finding that only
66% of location based apps provided a privacy policy).
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information about children and Californians—two groups that have
been afforded greater legal protection than the average person in the
U.S.95 Pending legislation would further require all companies that
collect location data to get users’ permission before collecting or
sharing it.96 But even when apps do ask users to agree to privacy
notices on a phone, the value of that exercise is questionable. Long
privacy policies in small print, split up over multiple pages on a small
mobile screen are not likely to put consumers on notice.97 For that
reason, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has recommended that
app developers work out alternatives to privacy policies, such as data
use icons, privacy dashboards, and just-in-time privacy disclosures.98
These tools are meant to communicate data practices in a streamlined
manner that take up less physical space on a mobile screen and
provides better overview.99
Effective privacy disclosures and meaningful consent primarily
protect a notion of privacy known as “control over information.”100
This is the idea that when individuals try to protect the privacy of
their information, they are not seeking to prevent everyone from
knowing it.101 Rather they want to control what particular individuals
know about them.102 They disclose more details about their personal
lives to their inner circle of friends, family, or others whom they
trust.103 Indeed, limited disclosure of information is considered

95. See United States v. W3 Innovations, No. CV-11-03958 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2011)
(“First COPPA case against a mobile application developer”); Brandon Bailey, California
Attorney General Sues Delta Air Lines Over Smartphone App Privacy Policy, MERCURY NEWS
(Dec. 7, 2012, 9:25 AM), http://www.mercurynews.com/business/ci_22141459/california-suesdelta-airlines-over-smartphone-app-privacy; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, MOBILE APPS FOR
KIDS: CURRENT PRIVACY DISCLOSURES ARE DISAPPOINTING (2012), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/02/120216mobile_apps_kids.pdf.
96. The Location Privacy Protection Act of 2011 (S. 1223), AL FRANKEN 1,
http://www.franken.senate.gov/files/documents/121011_LocationPrivacyProtection.pdf;
Brendan Sasso, Senate Panel Approves Franken’s Location Privacy Bill, THE HILL (Dec. 13,
2012, 6:29 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/272889-senate-panelapproves-frankens-location-privacy-bill; Devin Henry, Franken Pushes Last Minute Action On
Location Privacy Bill, MINNPOST (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.minnpost.com/dcdispatches/2012/12/franken-pushes-last-minute-action-location-privacy-bill.
97. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE 70 (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf.
98. FTC MOBILE PRIVACY DISCLOSURES, supra note 54.
99. See id. at 15-18.
100. See Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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necessary to foster those types of relationships.104 But at the same
time, people do not want their personal information to become public
or shared with individuals who have no business knowing it.105 At a
more functional level, control over information guards people against
prejudice. Unlike computers that make predictable determinations
based on specified parameters, humans are prone to making
subjective decisions based on gut feeling and without filtering out
certain irrelevant factors. It is therefore helpful to be able to shield
personal information like political affiliation or sexual orientation
from everyday decision makers, such as prospective employers or
teachers. In the digital age, privacy notices are meant to help mobile
users to manage the flow of their information by specifying what
particular information they reveal while using an app and how that
information will be used. The users may then select to share their
location data with friends over an online social network to provide
recommendations, or to meet up with friends that happen to be
around, or simply to let their friends know what they are up to.
Sometimes, they can control the information flow by restricting their
privacy settings such that their information is not publicly available to
others.
While notice and consent is currently the cornerstone of
American privacy law, it is notably absent from the process of
recognizing individuals with real-time identification apps. The
person whose face is automatically recognized may never even know
that she is being photographed or that the picture is used to identify
her in real-time. If the real-time identification app provides a privacy
notice upon installation, the notice is shown only to the user and does
not reach other people whose data is collected and used. Some apps
appear to rely on the notice that Facebook provides to its users when
they upload photos to the social network.106 But that notice cannot
reasonably warn a Facebook user that a particular real-time
identification app could use the photos years later to automatically
recognize the users’ face in public. It also cannot effectively inform
users that this information can be used to determine their location at
any point in time—even if they purposefully do not use geolocation
data on their own phones. In short, when a real-time identification

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See
FaceLook
Face
Recognition
Lite,
ITUNES,
https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/facelook-face-recognition/id512967999?mt=8
(“FaceLook
doesn’t recognize friends who blocked 3rd party apps from accessing their [Facebook] photo”).
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app identifies an individual in public, the app fails to provide the
person with an opportunity to control her information because the app
simply has no interaction with her.
C. The Ability to De-Anonymize a Face
Perhaps the most vocal concern with respect to real-time
identification apps is that they could be used to recognize anonymous
faces in the street.107 Face biometrics is particularly sensitive because
people expose their faces publicly at most times and the appearance
of a face cannot easily be altered.108 Today, people rely on the fact
that there are only a limited number of individuals that can recognize
them. They can seek to avoid those people when they do not wish to
be noted. As Alan Westin eloquently articulated:
[One] state of privacy, anonymity, occurs when the individual is in
public places or performing public acts but still seeks, and finds,
freedom from identification and surveillance. He may be riding a
subway, attending a ball game, or walking the streets; he is among
people and knows that he is being observed; but unless he is a
well-known celebrity, he does not expect to be personally
identified and held to the full rules of behavior and role that would
operate if he were known to those observing him. In this state the
individual is able to merge into the “situational landscape.”
Knowledge or fear that one is under systematic observation in
public places destroys the sense of relaxation and freedom that
109
men [and women] seek in open spaces and public arenas . . . .

The ability to remain anonymous in public allows individuals to
expose their unique faces while doing things they would not want
others to know about. This could be a “minor non-compliance” with
rules that we do not anticipate will be upheld at all times.110 As
Westin pointed out, society will sometimes let people off the hook for
minor traffic violations or for “smoking in the restrooms” to allow
them to release some of the pressure that society imposes upon them
107. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, FACING FACTS: BEST PRACTICES FOR COMMON USES OF
FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGIES i-ii (2012) [hereinafter FACING FACTS], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/facialrecognition/p115406commissionfacialrecognitiontechnologiesr
pt.pdf.
108. Yana Welinder, A Face Tells More Than a Thousand Posts: Developing Face
Recognition Privacy in Social Networks, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 165 (2012); see also FACING
FACTS, supra note 107, at 19 (discussing that “[a] consumer’s face is a persistent identifier that
cannot be changed in the way that a consumer could get a new credit card number or delete a
tracking cookie”).
109. ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 31 (1967).
110. Id.
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at other times.111 But sometimes the secret act is not going to be a
violation at all.112 Culturally, most people would not want to be seen
purchasing contraceptives by their parents, children, or even siblings.
They may not want their employer to see them going to a therapist or
an AA meeting. They may not want to have all their friends
witnessing how they desperately try to charm someone on a first date.
Real-time identification apps could be used to recognize individuals
in these potentially embarrassing moments. And they can be used to
spread information about what they were doing beyond the few
strangers that actually witnessed the situation in real-time.
D. Government Access to Data
While the discussion in this article focuses primarily on
companies’ collection and use of biometric data, it is entirely possible
for privately collected data to end up in the hands of government
agencies.113 Currently, an agency only needs a subpoena or a court
order issued pursuant to a lower standard than a warrant to obtain
biometric data or photos of identified individuals with time and
location meta data from a provider that stores the information
remotely (as opposed to on the users’ home computer).114 The agency
must first notify the user, but can postpone the notice if it believes
that the user will delete the information or there is another special
reason for not notifying the user in advance.115 There is now some
movement to introduce a warrant requirement when agencies try to
obtain location data.116 A pending bill would likely also apply to

111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, NSA Surveillance May Be Legal — But It’s
Unconstitutional, WASH. POST (June 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/nsasurveillance-may-be-legal--but-its-unconstitutional/2013/06/21/b9ddec20-d44d-11e2-a73e826d299ff459_story.html (last visited June 22, 2013).
114. Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b) (West 2013). Unlike the probable
cause showing that is normally required for a search warrant, a court order can be issued under
this provision “if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that there
are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the
records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation.” Id. § 2703(d). It should be noted that this provision only regulates data held by
providers of electronic communication and remote computing services. As such, an agency
seeking this type of data from another source, such as a shopping mall security camera, may not
even need to satisfy this lower standard.
115. Id. § 2705. If there is no special reason for postponing notice and the agency does not
wish to provide prior notice, it needs to get a warrant to obtain the information. Id. § 2703(a).
116. Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance Act, S. 639, 113th Congress (2013), available
at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s639.
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photo metadata because it is “derived from the operation of [a phone
and can] be used to determine or infer information regarding [a
person’s] location.”117 But the biometric data itself would still be
obtainable pursuant to a lower standard court order or a subpoena.
Moreover, there is even less data protection when an agency is
investigating something related to foreign intelligence.118 As a result
of the USA PATRIOT Act, the foreign intelligence issue does not
have to be the primary purpose of an investigation to suspend the
ordinary electronic surveillance protections; it need only be a
“significant purpose.”119
Privacy issues surrounding privately
collected biometric data are inextricable from issues of government
surveillance. If companies do not want to become conduits for
surveillance of their users,120 they also need to design their services to
avoid collecting or retaining unnecessary data.121
While it may be practical for government agencies to tap into
readily developed private databases with information, it is not the
only way that government agencies can get hold of biometric data.
The FBI is developing its own face recognition system, which is to
use a mug shot database of 12 million arrested individuals.122 It has
also partnered with state Departments of Motor Vehicles (DMVs) to
get access to databases of driver’s license photos.123 Coupled with
extensive anti-masking laws, expanding networks of closed-circuit
television (CCTV) cameras, and video surveillance by drones, it
could put an end to anonymity in public as we know it today.124 For

117. Id.
118. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(B), 1823
(a)(7)(B), and 1881(a).
119. Id.; In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (“FISA, as amended, does
not oblige the government to demonstrate to the FISA court that its primary purpose in
conducting electronic surveillance is not criminal prosecution.”).
120. See
ECPA
Reform:
Why
Now?
DIGITAL
DUE
PROCESS,
http://digitaldueprocess.org/index.cfm?objectid=37940370-2551-11DF-8E02000C296BA163
(last visited Nov. 7, 2013).
121. See infra Part IV.D.
122. Next
Generation
Identification,
FED.
BUREAU
OF
INVESTIGATION,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/ngi (last visited Nov. 7, 2013); FBI
Criminal Justice Information Services Division Staff Paper – Update on Next Generation
Identification, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (June 2012), https://www.eff.org/document/fbicjis-staff-paper-next-generation-identification.
123. FBI Performs Massive Virtual Line-up by Searching DMV Photos, ELECTRONIC
PRIVACY INFO. CENTER (June 17, 2013), http://epic.org/2013/06/fbi-performs-massive-virtuall.html (last visited June 23, 2013).
124. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.735 (West 2012) (“A person whose identity is
concealed by the person in a public place by means of a robe, mask, or other disguise, unless
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now, this system may not be very effective because photos of criminal
suspects, particularly images from security cameras, are not likely to
be the high quality frontal images that can easily be matched to mug
shots and driver’s license photos.125 This system will further not have
the benefit of contextual information that allows consumer apps to
make better guesses based on that users are more likely to appear in
photos with particular friends. That is unless the program mines
social network data, which it possibly does.126 Consumer apps also
rely on their users to confirm or deny automatic identification of their
friends, training the identification algorithm every time. Conversely,
it would be very difficult to continuously train a government
identification system as to all the individuals in its database, which
could include everyone with a drivers’ license.127 Given the likely
limited effectiveness of a government identification system, there is
also a potential for misidentification with severe civil liberties
implications for those who are unjustly accused. Although beyond
the scope of this article, we also need to think about appropriate
accountability for using face recognition in law enforcement.128 And
based on religious beliefs, or incidental to amusement, entertainment, protection from weather,
or medical treatment, is guilty of a misdemeanor.”); Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy:
Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 277
(2002); Webcast: Hearing on Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2012) (testimony of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director,
Federal
Bureau
of
Investigation),
available
at
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=36ffa9c8160f81a25730563dc7e8c551
(last visited June 23, 2013) (responding that the FBI currently uses “drones for surveillance on
U.S. soil”); FAA List of Certificates of Authorizations (COAs), ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/document/faa-list-certificates-authorizations-coas/ (last visited Nov. 7,
2013) (listing FBI as one of the agencies with drones certified by the Federal Aviation
Administration); see also Tim Maly, Anti-Drone Camouflage: What to Wear in Total
Surveillance, WIRED (Jan. 17, 2013, 3:14 PM), http://www.wired.com/design/2013/01/antidrone-camouflage-apparel/.
125. Sara Reardon, FBI Launches $1 Billion Face Recognition Project, NEWSCIENTIST
(Sept. 7, 2012), http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21528804.200-fbi-launches-1-billionface-recognition-project.html; Erika Eichelberger, Why Facial Recognition Technology Didn’t
Help ID the Tsarnaevs, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 23, 2013, 7:01 AM),
http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2013/04/facial-recognition-technology-boston-bombing.
126. See Richard Lardner, Your New Facebook ‘Friend’ May be the FBI, MBC NEWS
(Mar.
16,
2010,
10:54:25
AM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/35890739/ns/technology_and_science-security/t/your-newfacebook-friend-may-be-fbi/.
127. See Erika Eichelberger, Why Facial Recognition Technology Didn’t Help ID the
Tsarnaevs,
MOTHER
JONES
(Apr.
23,
2013,
7:01
AM),
http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2013/04/facial-recognition-technology-boston-bombing.
128. See Christopher Rutledge Jones, 'EyePhones': A Fourth Amendment Inquiry into
Mobile Iris Scanning, 63 S.C. L. REV. 925, 946 (2012); see also Francesca Bignami, European
Versus American Liberty: A Comparative Privacy Analysis of Anti-Terrorism Data-Mining, 48
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until government agencies develop their own effective identification
techniques, there will be a lot of temptation to use private sector
databases and identification methods, which are not adequately
protected by our outdated electronic surveillance laws.
III. EMERGING REGULATORY RESPONSES TO FACE RECOGNITION
TECHNOLOGY
As the discussion above suggests, real-time identification is in its
infancy. Even though implementations are relatively few, regulators
have yet to catch up to its development. A couple of states have
specific statutes regulating the collection and use of biometric data.129
In the rest of the U.S., the best hope of redress is the tort of intrusion
upon seclusion, which is problematic because a person’s facial
features will mostly not be secluded from the public and courts
generally do not consider data collection to be sufficiently offensive
for the tort.130 Over the past couple of years, however, a few general
regulatory responses to face recognition technology have provided
some initial guidance in this new field.
The debate over the privacy of face recognition technology
heated up in 2011 as Facebook introduced the “Photo Tag Suggest”
feature in Europe.131 Its earlier introduction in the U.S. was rather
uneventful.132 But the European launch triggered almost immediate
investigation by several European data protection agencies.133 After
B.C. L. REV. 609 (2007) (discussing the various procedural and substantive protections of law
enforcement use of data mining that have developed in Europe).
129. See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/5 (West 2012); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 503.001 (West 2012).
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977) (providing that “[o]ne who
intentionally intrudes, physically or other-wise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his
private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the
intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person”); see DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE
DIGITAL PERSON 59 (2004) (noting that courts have dismissed “actions based on obtaining a
person’s unlisted phone number, selling the names of magazine subscribers to direct mail
companies, and collecting and disclosing an individual’s past insurance history”).
131. See Justin Mitchell, Making Photo Tagging Easier, THE FACEBOOK BLOG (Dec. 15,
2010), https://www.facebook.com/blog.php?post=467145887130 (last updated June 30, 2011).
132. See id.
133. See Gesichtserkennungsfunktion von Facebook Verstößt Gegen Europäisches und
Deutsches Datenschutzrecht [Facebook’s facial recognition feature violates European and
German data protection law], HMBBFDI (Aug. 2, 2011), http://www.datenschutzhamburg.de/news/detail/article/gesichtserkennungsfunktion-von-facebook-verstoesst-gegeneuropaeisches-und-deutschesdatenschutzrech.html?tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=170&cHash=b9607e92ef91d779f308acd01b
7dd639 (last visited Apr. 27, 2012); see also BUNDESDATENSCHUTZGESETZ [BDSG] [FEDERAL
DATA PROTECTION ACT], Dec. 20, 1990, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL. I] at 2954, §§ 38(3)-
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the Hamburg Data Protection Agency concluded that the feature
violated European law, Facebook voluntarily discontinued its use in
Europe, apparently going beyond recommendations of the Irish Data
Protection Commissioner.134 But in the meantime, the European
Article 29 Working Party (WP29) issued an advisory opinion about
how face recognition technology can be implemented in online and
mobile technologies in compliance with European law.135 In the U.S.,
the Electronic Privacy Information Center asked the FTC to also
investigate Facebook’s Photo Tag Suggest, alleging that the feature
amounted to an unfair and deceptive trade practice under Section 5 of
the FTC Act.136 The FTC responded with a workshop in December
2011 to solicit comprehensive information about different uses of face
recognition technology.137 Based on that workshop, it recommended
best practices for the industry in October 2012. Ironically, in
Facebook’s spirit of “mov[ing] fast and break[ing] things,” Photo Tag
Suggest triggered rapid regulatory responses to many different
implementations of face recognition technology, which had
previously been developing in a near regulatory vacuum since the
1960s.138 While these responses are not primarily focused on realtime identification, they offer some insight into how the law will
address this technology.
A. Federal Trade Commission Guidelines on Face Recognition

38(4),
as
amended
Sept.
14,
1994,
available
at
http://www.bfdi.bund.de/EN/DataProtectionActs/Artikel/BDSG_
idFv01092009.pdf?__blob=publicationFile.
134. See PRESS RELEASE: Facebook’s Biometric Database Continues to Be Unlawful,
HMBBFDI 1 (Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.datenschutz-hamburg.de/uploads/media/PressRelease2011-11-10-Facebook_BiometricDatebase.pdf; Somini Sengupta & Kevin J. O’Brien, Facebook
Can ID Faces, but Using Them Grows Tricky, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2012, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/22/technology/facebook-backs-down-on-face-recognition-ineurope.html; Report of Review of Facebook Ireland’s Implementation of Audit
Recommendations Published – Facebook Turns off Tag Suggest in the EU, IRELAND OFF. OF
THE DATA PROTECTION COMMISSIONER (Sept. 21, 2012), http://www.dataprotection.ie/docs/2109-12-Press-Release--Facebook-Ireland-Audit-Review-Report/1233.htm.
135. WP29 Opinion, supra note 16.
136. See Complaint, In re Facebook, Inc. and the Facial Identification of Users, No. C4365
(F.T.C.
2011)
[hereinafter
Complaint,
Facebook],
available
at
http://epic.org/privacy/facebook/EPIC_FB_FR_FTC_Complaint_06_10_11.pdf; 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(a)(1) (2006).
137. FACING FACTS, supra note 107, at ii.
138. See Registration Statement (Form S-1), Facebook, 69 (Feb. 1, 2012),
http://battellemedia.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Facebook-S-1.pdf. I have previously
surveyed different laws that potentially apply to face recognition technology. Welinder, supra
note 107.
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Technology
The FTC’s recommended best practices for the use of face
recognition technology were based on its revised framework for
consumer privacy issued earlier in 2012.139 The framework would
require companies that collect significant amount of data to
implement three baseline principles into its use of consumer data: “[1]
privacy by design, [2] simplified choice, and [3] greater
transparency.”140 The best practices primarily apply these principles
to three case studies: the established fields of face detection in photos
and classification of faces by demographics in digital signs,141 and the
more groundbreaking use of the technology in social networks.142
The FTC did not discuss mobile technologies and real-time
identification in any greater detail. It mentioned them as “possible
future uses of facial recognition technologies.”143 Significantly, the
FTC noted that a real-time identification app capable of “identify[ing]
anonymous individuals on the street or in a bar could cause serious
privacy and physical safety concerns, although such an app might
have benefits for some consumers.”144 The FTC therefore suggested
that “affirmative express consent” may be necessary before a stranger
may recognize a previously unknown individual.145
“Opt-out
consent” would not be sufficient in that situation because there is no
going back once a stranger discovers a person’s identify.146 To
explain this concept, the FTC provided the following example:
Consider the example of a mobile app that allows users to identify
strangers in public places, such as on the street or in a bar. If such
an app were to exist, a stranger could surreptitiously use the
camera on his mobile phone to take a photo of an individual who is
walking to work or meeting a friend for a drink and learn that
individual’s identity—and possibly more information, such as her
address—without the individual even being aware that her photo

139. FACING FACTS, supra note 107, at 1.
140. FTC CONSUMER PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 61, at iii.
141. A digital sign is an advertising board with a built-in camera and software that can
determine the demographics of individuals that are looking at it. FACING FACTS, supra note
107, at i.
142. Id. at 2.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 8.
145. Id. at iii.
146. Id. at 19; see also DANIEL SOLOVE & PAUL SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY, TECHNOLOGY, &
LAW 433 (2012) (describing “opt-out” consent as providing “a default rule that the company can
use or disclose personal information in the ways it desires so long as the consumer does not
indicate otherwise”).
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was taken. Given the significant privacy and safety risks that such
an app would raise, only consumers who have affirmatively chosen
147
to participate in such a system should be identified.

The question remains how an individual can affirmatively submit
to such an identification system in practice. Is it sufficient for an
individual to provide consent to extraction of biometric data when
submitting a photo? Or does the individual need to allow each
particular app to use the photo? As this excerpt suggests, the FTC
does not believe this scenario to be an issue yet; the commissioners
were merely hypothesizing about possible requirements “[i]f such an
app were to exist.”148 This explains the lack of specificity in its
recommendation with respect to mobile apps. Indeed, the apps that I
have described above do not currently appear to be designed to allow
identification by strangers because they are limited to recognizing its
users’ Facebook friends.149 It is, however, entirely possible that such
an app may develop in the near future, leveraging Facebook’s vast
image database or other online photos that are even more easily
available.150 Therefore, the FTC has recommended that social
networks and other similar online services protect their photos against
scraping by third parties.151
Even when strangers do not perform the identification, users
may still need to “affirmative[ly and] express[ly] consent” to the use
of their biometric data if it “materially differ[s]” from the
representations pursuant to which they originally submitted their
photos.152 How would this recommendation apply to apps like KLIK,
FaceLook, and SocialCamera that use photos collected by Facebook?
It seems that if Facebook’s privacy policy does not specify that realtime identification apps can use Facebook photos to identify users
offline, the apps need to enter into separate clickwrap agreements
with Facebook users.153 And regardless of what the original privacy
147. Id. at iii.
148. FACING FACTS, supra note 107, at 6-7.
149. Limiting the identification to a user’s social network friends allows the current
applications to do more accurate recognition because one person’s social circle is less likely to
contain look-alikes. Matching faces to databases of several million individuals is still difficult
unless you have very high quality data. See Erika Eichelberger, Why Facial Recognition
Technology Didn’t Help ID the Tsarnaevs, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 23, 2013, 7:01 AM),
http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2013/04/facial-recognition-technology-boston-bombing.
150. Id.
151. FACING FACTS, supra note 107, at ii.
152. Id. at iii.
153. Clickwraps are terms that are agreed to by clicking “I agree terms and conditions.”
Nancy Kim, Clicking and Cringing, 86 OR. L. REV. 797, 810 (2007).
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policy provides, the apps would need to enter into new clickwraps
with any other individuals in photos—i.e. those who did not submit
the photo to Facebook in the first place. As of December 2012,
Facebook’s privacy policy does not specifically inform users that
their photos can be used by real-time identification apps.154 It does
provide that “[o]nce you share information with your friends and
others, they may be able to sync it with or access it via their mobile
phones and other devices.” It further provides that “[i]f you want to
completely block applications from getting your information when
your friends and others use them, you will need to turn off all
Platform applications.” However, extraction of biometric data and
real-time identification are uses that arguably are materially different
from Facebook’s broad representations that photos will be shared
with apps or synced to friends’ mobile phones. If so, the real-time
identification apps that tap into Facebook’s photo album also need to
get an “affirmative express consent” from the individuals they
identify. This is particularly important because Facebook’s privacy
policy notifies users that they are able to opt out of Facebook’s face
recognition feature when uploading photos. Given this more specific
provision suggesting control with respect to automatic face
recognition, users may reasonably conclude that the broader provision
regarding mobile apps does not pertain to face recognition
technology:155
We are able to suggest that your friend tag you in a picture by
scanning and comparing your friend’s pictures to information
we’ve put together from the other photos you’ve been tagged in.
This allows us to make these suggestions. You can control
whether we suggest that another user tag you in a photo using the
156
“How Tags work” settings.

The broader problem with online consent is that users seldom
know what they consent to even if they are prompted to agree to a
154. See
Data
Use
Policy,
FACEBOOK.COM
(Dec.
11,
2012),
https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/#infoaboutyou (last visited Nov. 7, 2013).
155. Provided that Facebook’s privacy policy is to be interpreted as a contract, a provision
that more directly applies to the matter at issue prevails over a more general provision when the
two are in conflict. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203(c) (1981) (“specific terms
and exact terms are given greater weight than general language”). However, sometimes privacy
policies are considered to be “general statements of policy” and not enforceable under contact
law. In re Northwest Airlines Privacy Litigation, No. Civ. 04-126, 2004 WL 1278459 (D.
Minn. June 4, 2004); see also Dyer v. Northwest Airlines Corp., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (D.N.D.
2004).
156. See
Data
Use
Policy,
FACEBOOK.COM
(Dec.
11,
2012),
https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/#infoaboutyou (last visited Nov. 7, 2013).
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clickwrap.157
It also appears that the FTC generally approves of opt-out choice
when the face recognition technology is part of the social network,
provided it is “easy to find” and “meaningful.”158 In that case, users
should get a conspicuous notice (not within the site’s privacy policy)
describing the new data collection and use.159 So if Facebook were to
reinstate its newly acquired app KLIK, it may not need to obtain
users’ affirmative consent to use their photos in this manner, provided
users get a separate notice on Facebook and are able to easily opt out.
The FTC also noted that particular applications of face
recognition technology can provide certain privacy or security
functions.160 This is the case with apps that look for a phone owner’s
facial features to unlock the phone.161 While these apps are not
intended to share biometric data, they still need to implement some
privacy measures, like storing the data securely.162
Other apps may not be privacy or security protective and yet
may raise less of a privacy concern because they do not “identify” an
individual. The FTC indicated that even apps that do not process
biometric data to determine the identity of individuals will have to
implement privacy protections that are appropriate for that particular
situation.163 It gave the example of SceneTap, which analyzes photos
from bars and informs consumers about the resulting demographics to
consumers through a mobile app.164 When an app does not link
biometric data to individual, it still needs to protect its photo database
from misuse and delete photos after a reasonable time.165
The few guiding principles in the FTC’s report with respect to
real-time identification do not create any hard legal obligations. They
are only intended as recommendations and the FTC expressly stated
that it will not base its enforcement actions on anything in the report

157. See Mark Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 466 (2006) (noting that
“Clickwraps put some pressure on the classical notion of assent derived from bargained
agreements, because they substitute a blanket, take-it-or-leave-it assent for the classical notion
that the parties actually thought about and agreed to the terms of the deal.”).
158. FACING FACTS, supra note 107, at 19.
159. Id. at 18-19.
160. Id. at 7.
161. Id. at 6.
162. Id. at 5-6.
163. Id. at 11-12.
164. FACING FACTS, supra note 107, at 5-6.
165. Id.
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that exceeds already established legal requirements.166 The report is
nevertheless helpful because it gives companies an initial idea as to
how future laws in this field could develop, and allow them to design
their services accordingly.
B. European Union Article 29 Working Party Opinion on
Facial Recognition in Online and Mobile Services
By the time the FTC issued its recommendations on the use of
face recognition technology in late 2012, some of its European
counterparts had already opined on the issue. First, the Hamburg data
protection agency deemed Facebook’s use of the technology to
violate European laws.167 Facebook tacitly agreed by disabling its
face recognition feature in Europe.168 Second, the WP29, charged
with providing independent advice on the implementation of national
laws adopted pursuant to the European Data Protection Directive,169
issued an opinion regarding the uses of face recognition technology in
online and mobile services.170 Given that the WP29 opinion
specifically focuses on mobile services, unlike the FTC, it provides
somewhat more concrete guidance with respect to real-time
identification apps.171 It should be noted that the WP29 opinion is of
limited legal authority because WP29 serves only an advisory role
with respect to the Directive, whereas the European Court of Justice
reserves “a monopoly of final interpretation” of EU law.172 But the
opinion is still a persuasive authority, given that it is the only EU
opinion on this specific matter.

166. Id. at iii.
167. See Facebook’s Biometric Database Continues to Be Unlawful, supra note 134.
168. Loek Essers, Facebook Deleted All EU Facial Recognition Data, Regulators
Confirm,
CFO
WORLD
(Feb.
07,
2013,
9:50
AM),
http://www.cfoworld.com/technology/57103/facebook-deleted-all-eu-facial-recognition-dataregulators-confirm.
169. Council Directive 95/46, arts. 29-30 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC) [hereinafter
Directive],
available
at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1995:281:0031:0050:EN:PDF (last visited
Nov. 26, 2012).
170. WP29 Opinion, supra note 16.
171. See id. at 3 (stating that the photo in its example of uses of face recognition
technology “may be captured direct from a smartphone camera.”).
172. Nial Fennelly, Legal Interpretation at the European Court of Justice, 20 FORDHAM
INT’L
L.J.
656,
673
(1996),
available
at
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1526&context=ilj (last visited Apr. 19,
2013).
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The EU Data Protection Directive—first adopted in 1995 and
now in the process of being updated—requires the EU member states
to adopt national legislation regulating the automatic processing of
personal data.173
Broadly, those laws are to ensure that a
“controller”174 of data processing protects the data and informs the
individuals to whom the data pertains about the controller’s data
practices.175 Subject to a few exceptions, personal data may only be
processed if the person to whom it pertains has freely consented or
when the processing is necessary to carry out a contract with that
person or a legal obligation.176
The WP29 opined that photos and personally identifiable
biometrics are personal data within the scope of the Directive.177 This
means that a real-time identification app that automatically processes
photos or personally identifiable biometrics must first get the
individuals’ informed consent before using their data, unless it has
some other legal basis for the processing.178 The app may not transfer
extracted biometrics to other systems.179 If it uses face recognition
technology to provide users with sensitive information about the
individual being identified, such as ethnicity, religious beliefs, or
health records, the app may further need to obtain special consent that
refers to that particular information.180 In any event, the app
developer must try to minimize the amount of data that the app
collects to what is absolutely necessary to deliver the service.181 The
data that is collected must also be carefully protected. The app
developer must determine whether the data should be stored on the
app or in the cloud and encrypted if necessary for its security.182 At
the same time, the individuals in the photos must have some way to
access the photos and biometric data.183 These requirements may not
apply to apps that only extract enough information to detect or
categorize a face because they are not processing “personal data.”184

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Directive, supra note 169, art. 5.
Id. art. 2(d).
See id. arts. 7, 17.
Id. art. 7.
WP29 Opinion, supra note 16, at 4.
Id. at 5; Directive, supra note 169, art. 7.
WP29 Opinion, supra note 16, at 5.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 4.
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If the main purpose of an app is automatic face recognition, it
appears that the app developer can provide sufficient notice by
describing the face recognition process in its terms of use.185 The
terms would of course need to be read and accepted by the individual
being identified and not only by the person using the app.186 But an
app developer cannot rely on provisions about face recognition
technology in the general terms of use of a social network from which
it takes photos because face recognition is not the main purpose of
that network.187 Opt-out privacy settings in an app or a social
network will likewise not suffice as informed consent, though they
are important for allowing users to take back their consent if they
have second thoughts.188 Most importantly, the opinion specified that
the current practice of opting individuals into a biometric database
simply because they upload photos to an online app does not comply
with the EU requirements.189 When sharing photos with friends
online, individuals likely do not anticipate that their photos will be
used for automatic face recognition and they may not even have the
authority to consent if there are other people in those photos.190
If an app developer cannot rely on the consent provided by the
phone user, how can it set up the service to obtain consent from the
person being identified? First, it would need to collect opt-in consent
from individuals when it enrolls them in a biometric database,
whether it does so through a social network or through the app
itself.191 But the EU requirements seemingly present a Catch-22 for
real-time identification apps because the app would need to process a
person’s biometric data to determine her identity, whereupon it can
determine whether she consented to the processing.192 If it turns out
that the individual is not listed in the app’s biometric database, the
initial processing of her data to determine her identity would be in
violation of the EU requirements.193 The WP29 opinion resolves this
issue by stating that apps may process photos or biometric data for the
limited purpose of determining whether the person in question

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

See WP29 Opinion, supra note 16, at 7.
See id. at 6.
See id. at 7.
See id. at 6-7.
See id. at 6.
See id. at 6-7.
See WP29 Opinion, supra note 16, at 6.
See id. at 5.
See id.
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consented to being identified.194 But if the match against the app’s
biometric database shows that the individual is either not listed or did
not consent, the app would need to delete all data it collected in the
process.195 In a real-time identification app, this would probably
mean that the app would not even show the individual’s name to the
person running the app if it turned out that the individual did not
consent to being identified. This limited processing, the WP29
reasoned, is necessary to allow app developers to comply with their
legal obligation to determine whether individuals in photos have
consented to their services.196
Beyond that, the opinion suggests that app developers may want
to allow users to blur out the faces of individuals that do not match
against their biometric database.197 That may help users to avoid
liability under other European laws that sometimes prohibit
photographing of faces in public places without first getting a
person’s consent.198
IV. INITIAL POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REAL-TIME
IDENTIFICATION
If the existing regulatory responses leave something to be
desired when it comes to real-time identification, how should this
problem be tackled? In a seminal 1890s piece articulating the
foundation of our current privacy law, Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis observed:
[Back when] the state of the photographic art was such that one’s
picture could seldom be taken without his consciously “sitting” for
the purpose, the law of contract or of trust might afford the prudent
man sufficient safeguards against the improper circulation of his
portrait; but since the latest advances in photographic art have
rendered it possible to take pictures surreptitiously, the doctrines of
contract and of trust are inadequate to support the required
199
protection, and the law of tort must be resorted to.

194. Id. at 5.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. WP29 Opinion, supra note 16, at 6.
198. See Elisabeth Logeais & Jean-Baptiste Schroeder, The French Right of Image: An
Ambiguous Concept Protecting the Human Persona, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 511, 526
(1998) (explaining that consent is required unless the photo does not focus on any particular
person, and the individuals who happen to be in the photo are performing “public, rather than
private, activities”).
199. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
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As this excerpt suggests, instantaneous photography challenged
the law some hundred years ago just like instantaneous face
recognition poses difficult questions today.200 In the years that
followed, it came upon courts, legislators, and the public at large to
determine the laws and norms regulating photography. The result
was not a complete prohibition of portable cameras or their use. To
the contrary, we have seen continuous innovation in analog and,
subsequently, digital cameras. But we have, for example, come to
prohibit photographing and videotaping private body parts without a
person’s consent.201 Thanks to Warren and Brandeis, we have also
developed torts that articulate specific situations when photographing
or publishing a photo may invade a person’s privacy.202 Other
jurisdictions have struck differently the balance between a person’s
privacy and the photographer’s right to capture images. For example
in France, a photo focusing on a particular person requires that
person’s consent—even if the photo is taken in public.203 Just like
photographs, face recognition will not go away. But it will require us
to figure out how and when it can be used.
In a recent article, I analyzed the privacy implications of the use
of face recognition technology in social networks.204 I concluded that
the use of photos submitted to an online application for the purpose of
socializing cannot be used to automatically identify individuals
without violating what Helen Nissenbaum calls “contextual integrity”
and I proposed a multifaceted solution to this problem. 205 It is much
too early to provide that level of analysis with respect to real-time
identification apps. The handful of existing apps do not adequately
suggest how different uses of face recognition will develop. They do,
however, indicate some of the privacy concerns considered in Part
II(A) above. Based on these conceptual observations, and drawing
upon the existing regulatory responses to face recognition technology,
this Part provides some early recommendations for how real-time
identification should be addressed. This analysis is by no means
intended as a complete policy response to this application of face
211 (1890).
200. See id.
201. Video Voyeurism Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1801 (2004).
202. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b (1977) (“The intrusion
itself makes the defendant subject to liability, even though there is no publication or other use of
any kind of the photograph or information outlined.”).
203. Logeais & Schroeder, supra note 198, at 526.
204. Welinder, supra note 108.
205. Id.
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recognition technology. Rather, it is meant to start the dialogue while
this application evolves to a point where its impact can better be
analyzed.
A. Focus on Use Rather than Technology
When comparing FTC’s Facing Facts report and the WP29
opinion broadly, it is clear that the latter offers far more concrete
guidance with the respect to real-time identification. There are
several reasons for this. First, the FTC did not intend to specifically
address mobile technologies in its report, as is obvious from the case
studies that it focused on and its suggestion that real-time
identification apps may not yet exist. Second, the WP29 opinion
applied concrete data protection legislation to this particular use.
Given that there is no baseline privacy legislation in the U.S., the law
is far less predictable and it is difficult for the FTC to provide
concrete guidelines for how companies may use biometric data.
Finally, and most importantly in my view, the FTC’s focus was too
broad. It sought to cover all kinds of face recognition technologies
from software “ensuring that the frame for a video chat feed actually
includes a face,” to “virtual makeover tools that allow consumers to
“try on” a pair of glasses or a new hairstyle online,” and to
“technologies that identify moods or emotions from facial
expressions,” just to name a few.206 The WP29 opinion, on the other
hand, focused only on a handful of online and mobile applications of
the technology and provided a number of specific recommendations
with respect to those applications.
The specificity of its
recommendations not only better protects consumers, but also makes
it easier for app developers to determine the bounds of the law when
they work on new services.
In my earlier recommendations on face recognition technology
in social networks, I argued against a blanket prohibition on face
recognition technology because the technology also presents useful
applications, many of which we are still to discover.207 Digital
cameras, for example, use face detection to focus the lens on a face.208
Face recognition technology built into photo management apps like
Picasa can help users who exhaust the seemingly limitless flash cards
in their digital cameras to automatically categorize all the photos on
206. FACING FACTS, supra note 107, at i, 5.
207. Id.
208. See Face Detection, SONY, http://www.sony.co.uk/hub/learnandenjoy/2/1 (last visited
Apr. 26, 2012).
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their computers.209 The gaming device Kinect uses face recognition
to keep track of different players so that friends can challenge each
other in dance or sports in their living rooms rather than just
exercising their thumbs with the more traditional forms of video
games.210
Particular uses of the technology, however, may be more
harmful. Though it is too early to tell, real-time identification apps
may arguably fall in the more harmful category, at least when used by
strangers. As such, they could invite more stringent regulation,
making their implementation very difficult, if not impossible. Any
regulation that could overly burden or eliminate uses of technology
needs to be preceded by very careful analysis. But more importantly,
any such regulation should narrowly target a use, rather than the
technology. With respect to real-time identification, this means
regulation should focus on real-time identification apps rather than
regulation covering all uses of face recognition technology.
Technology neutrality is a well-established regulatory principle that is
particularly beneficial for rapidly developing technologies.211 I would
argue that tech-neutrality is incorporated into the EU Data Protection
Directive, which regulates automatic processing of data—a use.
Though the WP29 opinion appears to focus on a technology, it merely
applies the tech-neutral Directive to particular uses of face
recognition. In that sense, the WP29 opinion is fundamentally
different from the FTC’s Facing Facts report, which seeks to provide
guidance for developing various applications that use face recognition
technology.212 Going forward, as regulators develop a response to
real-time identification with more teeth than the Facing Facts report,
they do well in considering the tech-neutrality principle. A techneutral solution does not mean that regulation has to be particularly
broad. It could, for example, specifically address the instantaneous

209. See Mitchell, supra note 132.
210. Douglas Gantenbein, Helping Kinect Recognize Faces, MICROSOFT RESEARCH (Oct.
31, 2011, 9:30 AM), http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/news/features/kinectfacereco103111.aspx.
211. See Bert-Jaap Koops, Should ICT Regulation Be Technology-Neutral?, in 9 IT & LAW
SERIES, STARTING POINTS FOR ICT REGULATION, DECONSTRUCTING PREVALENT POLICY ONELINERS 77 (Bert-Jaap Koops et al. eds., 2006) (arguing that “[l]egislation should abstract away
from concrete technologies to the extent that it is sufficiently sustainable and at the same
provides sufficient legal certainty”), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=918746.
212. Unlike the WP29 Opinion, which specifically applies the tech-neutral Directive, the
FACING FACTS report only “draw[s] upon the three core [tech-neutral] principles outlined in the
FTC’s March 2012 report” and is primarily based upon a workshop on face recognition
technologies. FACING FACTS, supra note 107, at 1.
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processing of biometric data, which would apply to real-time
identification as well as other similar processes.
It may seem that broad regulation of face recognition technology
will be more effective because it will cover new face recognition
technology implementations as they evolve, and does not as easily
become outdated. But that reasoning has two major flaws. First,
while broad regulation of automatic face recognition could provide
regulation of new implementations as they crop up, that regulation
may not be suitable for them because those uses would not have been
anticipated when the regulation was developed. The regulation will
likely unduly burden a new implementation and may not address any
of its problems (if there are any such problems to be addressed).
Second, regulation of particular uses may actually outlast seemingly
broader regulation of a technology.213 Consider, for example, a law
that would regulate collection of data indicating a person’s real-time
location. If well-drafted, such a law would apply to sensitive location
data in geolocation apps and real-time identification apps alike. And
it would apply to new technologies that would expose individuals in
the same manner.214 It would be more targeted at the relevant harm
and address all new technologies that have similar uses. Using
Lawrence Lessig’s vocabulary, the law would not need to be
translated into the language of the future—it will be timeless.215
Likewise, protection against identification of anonymous individuals
in public could regulate future technologies that would identify
individuals from a distance based on their smell or the rhythm of their
heartbeat.216
Conversely, the regulation of face recognition

213. See Koops, supra note 211; but see Christian Laux, Must RFID-Legislation Be
Technology Neutral?, THE CENTER FOR INTERNET AND SOCIETY AT STANFORD LAW SCHOOL
(Apr. 12, 2007, 1:02 PM), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2007/04/must-rfid-legislation-betechnology-neutral (arguing that tech-specific regulation may be appropriate for radio frequency
identification given that it allows the tracking of goods at a time of convergence of the physical
space and cyberspace through the “Internet of Things”).
214. See Koops, supra note 211 (noting that “particular attention must be given to the
sustainability of laws that target technology, because there is a greater risk than usual that
changes in the subject matter may soon make the law obsolete”).
215. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 157-169 (2d ed. 2006).
216. See Jacob Aron, Your Heartbeat Could Keep Your Data Safe, NEWSCIENTIST (Feb.
11, 2012), http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21328516.500-your-heartbeat-could-keepyour-data-safe.html; JOHN R. VACCA, BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGIES AND VERIFICATION SYSTEMS
215 (2007) (implying that odor recognition technology may one day recognize individuals,
provided that they have unique bodily odors); see also Paul Marks, Google Glass App Identifies
You
by
Your
Fashion
Sense,
NEWSCIENTIST
(Mar.
7,
2013),
http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21729075.600-google-glass-app-identifies-you-by-yourfashion-sense.html.
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technology would be useless with respect to these new technologies
even though they raise very similar concerns. Indeed, one day,
regulation of face recognition technology could sound just as outdated
as the regulation of gramophones or video cassette tapes sounds
today.217
B. Security by Design
Security is always important when a company holds personal
data. It is particularly important for biometric data given that, unlike
a compromised password or a stolen credit card, a person’s biometric
data cannot simply be replaced.218 If the photos or biometric data are
transferred between a mobile app and a website, there are additional
security risks because the data has to pass through multiple servers,
each of which could possibly be compromised. The WP29 therefore
recommended that apps be designed to locally process and store the
data.219 If that is not possible, the app developer should consider
using encrypted communication channels or making use of
cryptographic protocols for processing data.220 An individual’s
biometric data could also be split up over several servers to make
recognition difficult if one of them is compromised.221
Given that the app will already have a person’s biometric data, it
may be practical to use biometric encryption when accessing it.222
This would require the app to turn the biometric data into a random
string that can be used as a key to encrypt and decrypt information.223

217. For example, the regulation of “video cassette tapes” in the Video Privacy Protection
Act (VPPA) has caused the legislation to quickly seem antiquated. However, the VPPA also
regulates “similar audio-visual technology,” which essentially means that this is regulation of a
use rather than a technology. Therefore, it has been applied to various subsequent technologies
like DVDs and online video. Yana Welinder, Dodging the Thought Police: Privacy of Online
Video and Other Content Under the “Bork Bill,” HARV. J. L. & TECH. DIG. (Aug. 14, 2012, 6:11
PM), http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/legislation/dodging-the-thought-police-privacy-of-onlinevideo-and-other-content-under-the-bork-bill.
218. See Face Facts: A Forum on Facial Recognition Technology, FED. TRADE COMM’N 1
(Dec. 8, 2011), http://www.ftc.gov/video-library/transcripts/120811_FTC_sess3.pdf (Alessandro
Acquisti testifying that “[i]t’s much easier to change your name and declare ‘reputational
bankruptcy’ than to change your face.”).
219. WP29 Opinion, supra note 16, at 8.
220. Margarita Osadchy et al., SCiFI – A System for Secure Face Identiﬁcation, BENNY
PINKAS, 1 (May 2010), http://pinkas.net/PAPERS/scifi.pdf; see also WP29 Opinion, supra note
16, at 8.
221. Osadchy et al., supra note 220, at 1.
222. Id.
223. Ann Cavoukian & Alex Stoianov, Biometric Encryption: A Positive-Sum Technology
that Achieves Strong Authentication, Security and Privacy, INFORMATION AND PRIVACY
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Biometric encryption is sometimes considered more secure because it
uses a person’s face instead of a password that the person can
remember.224 Because the user does not have to memorize the data
derived from her facial features, biometric identifiers can use longer
and more complicated numbers that are more difficult to guess or
steal.225 However, it may be less effective when the identity of the
user is known and the data could be decrypted with a photo of the
user downloaded from a social network or found in an online image
search.226 For added security, the encryption could be based on
biometric data combined with a password that is selected by the
user.227
Some may argue that there is a technical hurdle if someone tries
to steal biometric data that has been derived using proprietary face
recognition software. The argument goes something like this: a
biometric database compiled with proprietary software can only be
used to identify the individuals using the same version of that
particular software. Consequently, a security breach only as to the
database may not affect the individuals unless there is also a security
breach as to the particular proprietary software. This argument is
based on “security by obscurity,” which in security research is not
considered to be a solid security strategy.228 In essence, keeping the
algorithm secret will not help because attackers will eventually find
vulnerabilities in the system.229 Indeed, it may be more effective to
open source the security development because, “given enough
eyeballs, all bugs are shallow.”230 Some may of course choose to
keep proprietary software secret for business reasons, but it is
certainly no substitute for encrypting their data.231
COMMISSIONER
OF
ONTARIO,
CANADA,
1
(Mar.
2007),
http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/resources/bio-encryp.pdf.
224. Id. at 12, 18.
225. Id.
226. See id. at 12 (discussing how biometric identification can be spoofed with images
instead of the actual face).
227. Lucas Ballard et al., Towards Practical Biometric Key Generation with Randomized
Biometric
Templates,
MICROSOFT
RESEARCH,
1
(Oct.
2008),
http://research.microsoft.com/pubs/121269/rbts.pdf.
228. See Peter Swire, A Theory of Disclosure for Security and Competitive Reasons: Open
Source, Proprietary Software, and Government Agencies, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 101, 105 (2006).
229. Id.
230. ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR 30 (1999) (describing
Linus’s Law of open source development).
231. See Steve Bellovin, Security Through Obscurity, RISKS DIGEST (June 6, 2009, 10:21
PM), http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/25.71.html#subj19 (citing “Kerckhoffs’ second principle,
translated as “[t]he system must not require secrecy and can be stolen by the enemy without

WELINDER

2013]

2/3/2014 12:33 PM

FACING REAL-TIME IDENTIFICATION

129

Even if biometric databases are kept secure, individuals are still
not safe from automatic face recognition by strangers. Around one
seventh of the earth’s population could have a labeled photo of them
available on Facebook.232 Others provide their headshots online
through LinkedIn or Google+, or on their company website. Those
images are connected to their name and often some other identifying
information that allows for instant recognition. And so, it is not
difficult to compile a biometric database using images available
online.233 The FTC has therefore recommended that companies that
store labeled photos should maintain their security and protect them
from being scanned for unauthorized uses.234 Even applications that
only process images without storing them—like digital signs—need
to consider the security to prevent outsiders from accessing the
images while they are being processed.235 Thus, if a real-time
identification app only allows users to identify their Facebook friends
while pointing their camera phone at them without taking or storing
any photos, it would still need to ensure that third parties cannot
compromise this process.236
C. Ask (the Right Person) for Permission
While disagreeing about the type of consent that should be
required, the FTC report and the WP29 opinion are consistent about
whom companies should ask for permission: the person to be
identified.237 The FTC report primarily recommends that companies
seek “affirmative express consent” before either allowing strangers to
recognize an individual or using the individual’s photo in a materially
new way.238 The WP29 opinion states that consent should be required
more broadly whenever a company collects photos or personally

causing trouble”).
232. See Alex Wilhelm, Facebook: Our 1 Billion Users Have Uploaded 240 Billion
Photos, Made 1 Trillion Connections, THE NEXT WEB (Jan, 15, 2013, 7:18 PM),
http://thenextweb.com/facebook/2013/01/15/facebook-our-1-billion-users-have-uploaded-240billion-photos-made-1-trillion-connections/.
233. Alessandro Acquisti et al., Face Recognition Study — FAQ, HEINZ COLLEGE,
CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY, http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/~acquisti/face-recognition-studyFAQ (last visited Nov. 20, 2012).
234. FACING FACTS, supra note 107, at ii, 11.
235. Id. at 13.
236. See
Ashkan
Soltani,
FacePalm,
ASHKANSOLTANI.ORG,
http://ashkansoltani.org/docs/face_palm.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2012).
237. FACING FACTS, supra note 107, at iii; see WP29 Opinion, supra note 16, at 5.
238. FACING FACTS, supra note 107, at iii.
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identifiable biometrics for automatic processing.239 Both agencies,
however, are in agreement that consent must be provided by the
individual whose face is identified rather than the person that uses the
face recognition technology or provides the photo.240 This will be
essential for regulation of real-time identification apps because they
will mostly identify individuals other than the user who downloads
the app to her phone.
The regulatory agenda with mobile apps right now is to ensure
that they provide notice and obtain consent from the phone user
before using their sensitive data such as geolocation, contacts, or
surfing habits.241 App developers are instructed to develop short and
sweet privacy notices that users can review when they download the
app.242
They are encouraged to develop privacy icons and
communicate their data practices to app users via privacy dashboards
and just-in-time notices.243 This approach, however, will not be
sufficient for real-time identification apps, which use sensitive data
that pertains to a third party who will not have access to those notices
on the phone.
Consent is meaningless unless the person knows to what she is
consenting. A clause hidden in a social network’s term of use should
not be legally sufficient to put an individual on notice that apps can
tap into that network to gather identifying data. Given that users
generally do not read the terms, the WP29’s focus on the main
purpose of the app is helpful.244 If the main purpose of an app is to
recognize faces, the users who provide their photos will anticipate
that they will be used in this manner. If the main purpose is different,
however, a separate notice and consent is needed to put the users on
notice.245 The FTC has articulated a similar idea in its recent
consumer privacy guidelines, which provide that separate consent
may not be required when a data “practice is consistent with the
context of [a] transaction or the consumer’s existing relationship with

239.
240.
241.

WP29 Opinion, supra note 16, at 5.
FACING FACTS, supra note 107, at iii; see WP29 Opinion, supra note 16, at 5.
See FTC MOBILE PRIVACY DISCLOSURES, supra note 54; FTC CONSUMER PRIVACY
REPORT, supra note 61; Kamala D. Harris, Privacy on the Go: Recommendations for the Mobile
Ecosystem, STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., 1 (Jan. 2013),
http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/pdfs/privacy/privacy_on_the_go.pdf.
242. FTC CONSUMER PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 61.
243. FTC MOBILE PRIVACY DISCLOSURES, supra note 54.
244. WP29 Opinion, supra note 16, at 7.
245. See id.
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the business.”246
Limited non-consensual collection and processing may be
acceptable in narrow situations to allow apps to determine whether a
person has consented.247 It may also be necessary to find missing
persons or to identify an injured individual who is unable to
consent.248 Such exceptions can be complemented by technology that
allows individuals to object to even this preliminary collection and
processing—perhaps by registering their general objections
beforehand. To avoid generating a database of objecting individuals
similar to the Do-Not-Call register, there may be ways to
communicate an objection directly to a real-time identification app.249
Regardless of how it is achieved, an individual should have the ability
to avoid collection altogether, particularly as apps do have a tendency
to collect more data than necessary and to not take adequate
precautions that the information is permanently deleted afterward.
This brings us to the next recommendation: limited collection and
regular deletion.
D. Collect Less; Delete More
Even when biometric data is collected for a particular purpose
and pursuant to informed consent, there is the potential for subsequent
function creep—i.e. that the data could later be misused for a different
purpose.250 When the FTC held a hearing in 2012 to consider how
companies should protect consumer privacy going forward, several
groups representing the consumers expressed concern that companies
are allowed to collect more data than necessary to provide their

246. FTC CONSUMER PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 61, at 39.
247. See WP29 Opinion, supra note 16, at 5.
248. See Directive, supra note 169, art. 8(c) (providing an exception to the consent
requirement when “processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of
another person where the data subject is physically or legally incapable of giving his consent”).
249. For example, a camera phone could pick up a message via infrared light emitted by a
device on a person indicating that she does not wish to be recognized. See Welinder, supra note
108, at 225 (discussing patented technology that would enable a camera phone “to receive
messages via infrared light [that] . . . could for example read: ‘Please do not collect my
biometric data.’”); Jack Purcher, Apple Working on a Sophisticated Infrared System for iOS
Cameras, PATENTLY APPLE (June 2, 2011, 7:19 AM), http://www.patentlyapple.com/patentlyapple/2011/06/apple-working-on-a-sophisticated-infrared-system-for-ios-cameras.html.
Alternatively, regulators could establish certain free-zones from face recognition, similar to
prohibitions on photographing commonly found in public restrooms and gym changing rooms.
250. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion on ‘Developments in Biometric
Technologies,’ 2012 00720/12 (WP 193) (EN) 2012 O.J. (L 720) 17 (EN), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinionrecommendation/files/2012/wp193_en.pdf (describing “function creep”).
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services.251 Companies also often lack clear data retention policies
that would determine when data should be deleted. Excessive
collection of data and its retention for an indefinite time exposes
consumers to risks that the data can be misused later. This is
particularly problematic for companies that use location data, which
can be used to predict a person’s future movement. It is likewise a
problem for biometrics that can be misused to de-anonymize faces in
the street. Mobile apps that collect and store this kind of data
therefore need to limit their collection and regularly delete data that is
not needed for their services. Problematically, mobile app developers
often lack the organizational infrastructure to maintain a good data
retention policy.252
The FTC and WP29 are mostly in agreement on this point. The
FTC has incorporated data collection and retention into its “privacy
by design” principle.253 It recommended that companies only collect
as much data as consumers expect based on their services.254 Any
additional collection should be accompanied by a separate, timely,
and conspicuous disclosure (in addition to the regular privacy
policy).255 The FTC further recommended that companies delete or
anonymize data after it has served its initial purpose.256 The FTC
invited industry groups to come up with reasonable retention periods
for different businesses.257 It noted specifically that companies
collecting location data—like real-time identification or geolocation
apps—should delete that data early.258 The FTC also encouraged the
development of “eraser button[s]” to allow consumers to directly
delete the data that they upload.259 To be effective, the buttons need
to actually delete data from companies’ databases and not only from

251.
252.

See FTC CONSUMER PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 61, at 26-28.
Mathew J. Schwartz, Data Retention Policies Absent Or Partially Implemented,
INFORMATION WEEK (Aug. 5, 2010, 8:00 AM), http://www.informationweek.com/storage/dataprotection/data-retention-policies-absent-or-partia/226600018 (reporting an Applied Research
study, which showed that “87% of IT and legal professionals believe that having a formal data
retention plan is important for knowing which information to retain or delete[, while] only 46%
of their organizations actually have such a plan”).
253. FTC CONSUMER PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 61, at 44.
254. Id. at 27.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 28.
257. Id. at 29.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 29, 70 (giving Facebook as an example of companies that have already
implemented these kind of buttons).
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the consumer-facing side of the product.260 Today, deleting a photo in
Facebook does not necessarily protect a user from being identified
with real-time identification apps because the photo is only removed
from the user’s profile and it may not be deleted from Facebook’s
database until 90 days after the user completely deletes her profile.261
Consistent with its general privacy framework, the FTC’s report
on face recognition recommended that companies develop retention
policies for photo and biometric data.262 Photos and biometric data
should only be retained while needed to provide the relevant
service.263 So, if a user deletes her account or turns off the face
recognition function, the data is obviously no longer needed.264 As an
example, the FTC cited the face recognition feature in the Google+
social network, which deletes all biometric data once a user
withdraws her opt-in consent to use the feature.265
The WP29 opinion, for its part, applied the minimal collection
principle found in the EU Data Protection Directive to automatic face
recognition.266 It stated that apps should collect the minimal amount
of biometrics necessary to carry out the service.267 It also noted that
data must be deleted once it is not necessary for the purpose for which
it was collected, such as when the only purpose of the face
recognition was to identify the individual to determine if she
previously consented to the use of her data.268

260. See, e.g., Lance Ulanoff, Snapchat CEO: Delete Is the Default, MASHABLE (Apr. 16,
2013), http://mashable.com/2013/04/16/snapchat-ceo-delete-default/ (describing a chatting
service that deletes pictures from service, as well as the recipient computer, within seconds of
delivery).
261. See, e.g., Ryan Budish, In the Face of Danger: Facial Recognition and the Limits of
Privacy Law, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1870, 1884-85 (2007) (suggesting that deletion of names from
a biometric database would allow “citizens [to] secure their privacy without hiring attorneys or
clogging the judicial system”); see also Facebook Data Use Policy, supra note 31 (stating that
“some information may remain in backup copies and logs for up to 90 days” after an account is
deleted); but see FACING FACTS, supra note 107, at 18 n.70 (referring to Facebook’s testimony
that “Facebook deleted any previously collected biometric data” “if a user opted out of
Facebook’s ‘Tag Suggest’ feature”).
262. FACING FACTS, supra note 107, at ii.
263. Id. at 11.
264. Id. at 11, 18.
265. Id. at 18.
266. WP29 Opinion, supra note 16, at 5, 8; Directive, supra note 169, art. 6.
267. WP29 Opinion, supra note 16, at 5 (“[P]rocessing must first be compliant with data
quality requirements (Article 6). In this case the digital images of individuals and the respective
templates must be “relevant” and “not excessive” for the purposes of the facial recognition
processing.”).
268. WP29 Opinion, supra note 16, at 5d.
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It is clear that American and European regulators alike are
thinking about data minimization with respect to automatic face
recognition. Companies would do best to adopt data retention
policies early before they become overwhelmed by data that they
collect. Avoiding unnecessary collection and retention will not only
protect consumers from misuse within companies, but will also
prevent misuse by third parties if there is a security breach and make
it easier for companies to respond to law enforcement requests.
E. Think About the Context and User Experience Design
Real-time identification based on photos uploaded to a social
network or otherwise available online presents a conceptual problem
for our traditional understanding of privacy. Even though many
would consider real-time identification of people in photographs
posted online to be a privacy violation, traditionally, those photos
would not qualify as secret information or information found in a
completely private space.269 One privacy theory that can address this
issue is Helen Nissenbaum’s theory of contextual integrity.270 I have
previously applied this theory to explain the controversy surrounding
the use of face recognition in social networks.271 Essentially, that
scenario violates contextual integrity by transforming information that
users share through photos, to personally identifying biometric data
and sharing the information with new recipients beyond users’
control.272 Real-time identification exacerbates this problem by using
information shared in an online context to identify individuals in an
offline context. It can link various online actions to an otherwise
anonymous face. Offline, it can also use biometric data to determine
the location of an individual. There are thus two transformations of
information: from photos to biometric data and, ultimately, to location
data. The transformations evidence “a prima facie violation of
contextual integrity,” which can only be overcome if the practice
advances an important social concern.273 This contextual analysis
should be taken into account when designing a service to avoid
abusing users’ trust.
The FTC has also adopted something resembling Nissenbaum’s

269. Welinder, supra note 108, at 180-81.
270. NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT, supra note 55, at 2.
271. Welinder, supra note 108, at 186-88.
272. Id.
273. See NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT, supra note 55, at 150, 182 (describing “a
prima facie violation of contextual integrity”).
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contextual analysis in its new recommended business practices for
consumer privacy:
Companies should limit data collection to that which is consistent
with the context of a particular transaction or the consumer’s
relationship with the business, or as required or specifically
authorized by law. For any data collection that is inconsistent with
these contexts, companies should make appropriate disclosures to
consumers at a relevant time and in a prominent manner – outside
274
of a privacy policy or other legal document.

Similarly, the FTC has emphasized the scope of a transaction’s
context when discussing notice and consent for face recognition
processes. It noted, for example, that automatic face recognition is
inconsistent with the context of a social network.275 A social network
should therefore separately notify its users if it decides to start using
photos to automatically identify faces.276 When it cannot provide
notice to individuals—perhaps because they do not use the social
network—it should not use labeled photos of them to create a
biometric database.277 The separate notice must be accompanied by a
conspicuous ability to opt-out and a mechanism that deletes all photos
and biometric data once a user opts-out.278 I would argue that opt-out
choice—however conspicuous—is not sufficient to protect against
extra-contextual face recognition. Opt-out settings are notoriously
underutilized, particularly by children.279 Given that users upload
photos to social networks with the particular purpose of socializing
with their friends, specific opt-in consent should be required before
using them in this vastly different manner.
The FTC’s attention to the context of transactions is similar to
the WP29’s consideration of the main purpose of an application when
determining whether separate user consent is necessary.280 Both are

274. FTC CONSUMER PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 61, at 19.
275. FACING FACTS, supra note 107, at 18.
276. Id. at 18-19.
277. Id. at 19.
278. Id.
279. See Alessandro Acquisti & Ralph Gross, Imagined Communities: Awareness,
Information Sharing, and Privacy on the Facebook, 2006 PRIVACY ENHANCING TECH.
WORKSHOP
16,
available
at
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.93.8177&rep=rep1&type=pdf
(“[A]mong current members, 30% claim not to know whether [Facebook] grants any way to
manage who can search for and ﬁnd their proﬁle, or think that they are given no such control.”);
See also Michelle Madejski et al., The Failure of Online Social Network Privacy Settings,
FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM (July 2011), http://bit.ly/MlkhFT.
280. WP29 Opinion, supra note 16, at 7; see supra Part III.C.
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examples of a general trend towards focusing on users’ experience of
transactions, rather than written privacy policies.281 Developers can
influence the user experience through product design—effectively
creating a desired context. User experience design instinctively
makes a user aware of data collection without the need to read or
understand a privacy policy. It can also provide notice to individuals
beyond the primary user of a product. For example, a camera can
produce a shutter sound or a flash that tells a person that she is being
photographed.282 Similarly, security cameras are sometimes equipped
with a screen showing customers that they are being recorded in real
time instead of posting a “smile, you’re on camera” notice next to the
camera.283 One could imagine a real-time identification app in a
phone or a pair of computer glasses that loudly announces the name
of a recognized subject, putting her on notice that she is identified and
perhaps allowing her to prevent an embarrassing photo from being
posted to her social network profile. While the exact implementation
of such a feature might vary, the general idea of notifying subjects
when recognized is a palpable example of privacy protective user
experience design.284 An alternative design would be an app that
allows each user to compile a biometric database specific to an
individual device. Each user would then only be able to recognize
individuals that appear in her own user-generated database.285 The

281. Woodrow Hartzog, Website Design as Contract, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1635, 1653
(2011) (“A growing body of literature in the field of human-computer interaction has focused on
what are known as ‘privacy indicators’—designs such as logos, icons, settings, and seals used to
intuitively convey a website’s policy regarding collection and use of personal information.”);
See Calo, supra note 53, at 1033-34, 1041 (2012) (suggesting that privacy notices be designed
based on users’ “familiarity” with older technologies and their “psychological responses” to
certain elements, as well as by “demonstrating the result of company [data] practices”); See
Deirdre K. Mulligan & Jennifer King, Bridging the Gap Between Privacy and Design, 14 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 989, 1018-19, 1021 (2012) (stating that “over the past two decades, a growing body
of privacy-focused [human-computer interaction] research has emerged to address the
development of ubiquitous computing technologies” and noting that a user-centric form of
privacy by design “demands attentiveness to context and human experience, the very attributes
that companies, through privacy notices, attempt to disavow and make irrelevant.”). At a more
general level, user experience design is based on the more established research fields of
cognitive psychology and human factors. Id. at 1020.
282. See Calo, supra note 53, at 1036-37 (“Analog cameras make a click and, often, emit a
flash when taking a picture.”). Id.
283. See Photo of Self-Checkout at Home Depot, FLICKR (Apr. 19, 2011),
http://www.flickr.com/photos/ginger-jengibre/5635513442/in/photostream/.
284. The feature could, for example, also generate a digital record of the recognition and
transmit it to the identified individual via email or a text message, including the time and place
of the recognition and the identity of the device that performed it.
285. The user-generated database could also contain individuals that have never met the
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design would play on people’s expectations that a person they interact
with may remember them next time, no matter how brief the initial
interaction. To maximize innovation in privacy design, regulation
should not try to mandate any particular design like a camera shutter
sound,286 but should instead leave it to developers to come up with
effective solutions to the third-party notice problem.287
CONCLUSION
Although face recognition technology has been evolving for
decades, its policy ramifications remained largely unexplored. The
recent implementation of the technology into consumer applications
provoked rapid policy responses. These responses, however, did not
comprehensively address real-time identification. The FTC report on
face recognition technology, in particular, implied that real-time
identification apps were yet to hit the market and provided some
preliminary recommendations of what such apps should avoid.288
In reality, however, real-time identification apps are already on
sale and call for us to begin thinking about when and how their use
may be inappropriate. While these apps resemble mobile apps that
use geolocation data, real-time identification apps raise additional
issues because they collect location information about third parties
and are capable of identifying anonymous faces in the street. The
regulatory solutions that are being developed for geolocation apps—
such as shorter privacy notices for mobile screens and just-in-time
disclosures to users—will therefore not work for real-time
identification.
As the FTC will inevitably have to review real-time
identification apps, it would do well to focus on this particular use
rather than seeking to address it along with other face recognition
applications. That will ensure technology neutral regulation that
addresses the specific issues raised by real-time identification and that
will apply to similar uses in the future without affecting vastly

user but opt in to being recognizable by her—making blind dating and other such first meetings
much less awkward.
286. Contra Camera Phone Predator Alert Act, H.R. 414, 111th Cong. (2009), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr414 (seeking to require camera phones to make a
sound while photographing).
287. See Deirdre K. Mulligan & Jennifer King, Bridging the Gap Between Privacy and
Design, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 989, 1019 (2012) (noting “that Facebook, Google, Apple,
Microsoft, Twitter, and other companies employ significant numbers of [human-computer
interaction] researchers” that look into the issue of user experience design).
288. FACING FACTS, supra note 107.
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different uses of face recognition technology. With respect to the
apps available today, the policy response should consider how
relevant individuals could be put on notice, given that these apps
affect other individuals in addition to the app user. The policy
response will also need to consider how these apps can minimize their
data collection and retention and keep the data secure. Importantly,
the policy will also need to consider the initial context in which the
data is collected—particularly given that today’s apps take advantage
of photos that people share with their friends in social networks.
Future real-time identification apps may raise additional issues
because of their design, which will need to be addressed at that time.
This should not stop us from getting the ball rolling.

